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In	  2012	  Australia	  became	  the	  first	  country	  in	  the	  world	  to	  introduce	  plain	  tobacco	  packaging	  in	  an	  effort	  
to	   reduce	   tobacco	   consumption.	   This	  move	  was	   vehemently	   opposed	   by	   the	   tobacco	   industry,	   which	  
challenged	  it	  on	  several	  levels:	  nationally,	  bilaterally	  and	  multilaterally	  at	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  
(WTO).	  The	  political	  behavior	  of	   the	   tobacco	  companies	   in	   this	   case	   is	  puzzling	  both	   in	   terms	  of	   scale,	  
operating	  at	  multiple	   levels	  at	  the	  same	  time	  and	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  countries	  mobilized	   in	  their	  defence.	  
WTO	   litigation	   is	   typically	   the	   result	   of	   Multi	   National	   Enterprises	   (MNEs)	   lobbying	   their	   own	  
government,	   but	   here	   third	   countries	   were	   mobilized.	   Lobbying	   in	   third	   country	   contexts,	   with	   the	  
objective	   of	   accessing	  multilateral	   dispute	   settlement	   systems,	   has	   been	   little	   studied.	  We	   thus	   know	  
very	   little	   about	   the	   driving	   factors	   behind	   such	   activities,	   how	   target	   governments	   are	   selected	   and	  
what	   lobbying	   strategies	   are	   used.	   	   This	   paper	   draws	  on	   emerging	   research	  on	   transnational	   lobbying	  
and	  a	  case	  study	  of	   the	  PP	  case	   to	  explore	   these	   issues	   in	  detail	  and,	  by	  doing	  so,	  aims	   to	   further	  our	  
theoretical	   understanding	   of	   the	   political	   economy	   of	   international	   trade	   in	   the	   context	   of	   increasing	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INTRODUCTION	  
In	  2012	  Australia	  became	  the	  first	  country	  in	  the	  world	  to	  introduce	  a	  legal	  requirement	  that	  cigarettes	  
be	  presented	   in	  plain	  packaging	   (PP),	  as	  a	  public	  health	  measure	   to	   reduce	  tobacco	  consumption.	  This	  
move	  was	  vehemently	  opposed	  by	  Transnational	  Tobacco	  Companies	  (TTCs).	  Their	  subsequent	  political	  
behavior	  is	  puzzling	  for	  two	  reasons.	  For	  one,	  TTC	  political	  action	  took	  place	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  national	  
and	   international	   law	   almost	   simultaneously:	   TTCs	   initiated	   and	   supported	   a	   complaint	   by	   Ukraine,	  
Honduras,	  Dominican	  Republic,	  Cuba	  and	  Indonesia	  against	  Australia’s	  plain	  packaging	  rules	  at	  the	  World	  
Trade	   Organisation’s	   (WTO)	   ,	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   also	   pursuing	   investor	   state	   arbitration	   in	   the	  
context	  of	  a	  Bilateral	   Investments	  Treaty	   (BIT)	  and	  a	  domestic	  court	  case	   in	  Australia.	  This	  multilateral	  	  
approach	   runs	   counter	   to	   the	   traditional	   view	   in	   the	   literature	   that,	   as	  WTO	   litigation	   is	   a	   very	   costly	  
affair,	   firms	   only	   resort	   to	   lobbying	   governments	   for	   WTO	   action	   after	   all	   other	   options	   have	   been	  
exhausted	  (Bown	  2009).	  What	   is	  more,	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  TTCs	  to	  engage	   in	  transnational	   lobbying	  and	  
approach	  host	  governments	  to	  challenge	  third	  country	  legislation	  in	  the	  WTO	  is	  unusual.	  Multi	  National	  
Enterprises	  (MNEs)	  usually	  lobby	  their	  home	  government	  when	  seeking	  redress	  at	  the	  WTO	  (Davis	  2012;	  
Zimmerman	  2011).	  What	   is	   even	  more	   striking,	   is	   that	   none	  of	   the	   plaintiff	   countries	   in	   this	   case	   is	   a	  
significant	  exporter	  of	  tobacco	  to	  Australia.	  They	  therefore	  seem	  unlikely	  to	  be	  strongly	  affected	  by	  the	  
new	  restrictions	  and,	  as	  a	  consequence,	  subject	  to	  rather	  limited	  compensation,	  even	  if	  the	  case	  were	  to	  
be	  ruled	  in	  their	  favour	  (Fooks	  and	  Gilmore	  2013).	  	  
	   In	   this	  paper	  we	  engage	   in	  an	   in-­‐depth	  analysis	  of	   the	  complex,	   resource	   intensive	  multilateral	  
and	  transnational	  corporate	  political	  activity	  (CPA)	  of	  TTCs	  in	  their	  attempt	  to	  challenge	  the	  Australian	  PP	  
laws.	  CPA	  is	  usually	  understood	  as	  ‘…corporate	  attempts	  to	  shape	  government	  policy	  in	  ways	  favorable	  
to	   the	   firm’	   (Hillman	   et	   al	   2004).	   We	   define	   ‘transnational’	   CPA	   as	   engaging	   in	   CPA,	   which	   seeks	   to	  
influence	   decision	   makers	   in	   a	   country	   other	   than	   the	   home	   state	   of	   the	   MNE.	   We	   focus	   on	   three	  
questions:	   (i)	   what	   factors	   guide	   the	   choice	   of	   MNEs	   to	   rapidly	   move	   their	   political	   activities	   to	   the	  
multilateral	   level?	   (ii)	  what	   explains	   the	   decision	   of	  MNEs	   to	   target	   non-­‐home	   countries	   and	   on	  what	  
basis	  do	   they	  choose	  certain	   target	  governments	  over	  others?	   (iii)	  how	  can	  we	  explain	   the	  decision	  of	  
host	  governments	  to	  mobilize	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  foreign	  firms?	  	  
	   The	  key	  aim	  of	  the	  paper	  is	  to	  further	  our	  theoretical	  understanding	  of	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  
international	   trade	   in	   general	   and	   transnational	   CPA	   by	   MNEs	   in	   particular.	   We	   hold	   that	   the	  
fundamental	   questions	   that	   our	   case	   study	   raises,	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   choice	   of	  MNEs	   to	   seek	   to	   pursue	  
disputes	   at	   the	  multilateral	   level,	   to	   lobby	  host	   governments	   and	   to	   seek	   to	   create	   common	   interests	  
with	   these	   target	   states,	   have	   relevance	   well	   beyond	   tobacco.	   Existing	   literature	   increasingly	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acknowledges	   that	   the	   globalization	   of	   production	   and	   the	   emergence	   of	   Global	   Value	   Chains	   (GVCs)	  
expands	   the	   potential	   for	   CPA	   across	   markets	   and	   simultaneously	   raises	   the	   possibility	   to	   leverage	  
political	  influence	  in	  certain	  host	  countries	  in	  order	  to	  pursue	  interests	  at	  a	  level	  above	  the	  nation	  state	  
(see	  e.g.	  Curran,	  2015;	  Eckhardt	  and	  de	  Bievre,	  2015;	  Windsor	  2007).	  However,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  increasing	  
globalization	  of	  economic	  activity,	   the	   focus	  of	  much	   research	  on	   trade	  policy	  has	   continued	   to	  be	  on	  
domestic	   (i.e.	   home	   country)	   lobbying.	  Our	   findings	   for	   the	   PP	   case	   confirms	   a	   trend	   towards	   greater	  
engagement	   by	  MNEs	   at	   the	  WTO	   level	   and	   help	   to	   identify	  which	   factors	   explain,	   and	   indeed	   drive,	  
multilateral	  and	  transnational	  lobbying	  in	  the	  field	  of	  trade	  policy.	  We	  argue,	  that	  our	  understanding	  of	  
the	   political	   economy	   of	   international	   trade	   regimes	   needs	   to	   evolve	   beyond	   the	   conventional	   two	  
country,	   two	   industry	   models,	   where	   import	   protection	   is	   the	   key	   trade	   policy	   on	   which	   firms	   lobby	  
governments	   and	   the	  home	   government	   is	   the	   key	   focus	   for	  MNEs	   seeking	   to	   influence	  policy	   (Baron	  
1997).	  We	  highlight	  the	  growing	  complexity	  of	  industry-­‐government	  trade	  policy	  interactions	  in	  the	  age	  
of	  GVCs	  and	  seek	  to	  better	  explain	  them.	  In	  doing	  so,	  we	  unravel	  the	  factors	  that	  explain	  the	  choice	  of	  
MNEs	  to	  lobby	  certain	  host	  governments	  over	  others,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  governments’	  decision	  to	  mobilize	  at	  a	  
multilateral	  level	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  foreign	  firms.	  	  
	   The	  paper	  also	  adds	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  firm	  lobbying	  in	  the	  context	  of	  disputes	  about	  cross	  
border	   challenges	   to	   domestic	   regulation.	   Such	   challenges	   have	   become	   increasingly	   common	   in	   the	  
global	   economy	   and,	   despite	   growing	   scholarly	   attention	   (De	   Bièvre	   et	   al.	   2014;	   Lawton	   et	   al	   2009;	  
Roemer-­‐Mahler	  2013;	  Young	  2012;	  Young	  2016),	  we	  know	  surprisingly	  little	  about	  the	  effect	  of	  this	  shift	  
in	  lobbying	  by	  economic	  actors.	  In	  this	  endeavor,	  we	  not	  only	  aim	  to	  provide	  insights	  into	  firm	  lobbying	  
on	  trade	  issues,	  but	  also	  on	  transnational	  lobbying	  more	  generally.	  There	  is	  a	  large	  body	  of	  literature	  on	  
transnational	  advocacy	  by	  NGOs	  (e.g	  Bob	  2013;	  Kastner	  2014;	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  1999;	  Rietig	  2016),	  but	  
transnational	  CPA	  has	  only	   received	   scant	  attention	   in	   the	  extant	   literature	  and	  very	   few	  studies	  have	  
focused	  on	   the	  choice	  of	   target	  government	   in	   transnational	   lobbying	   that	  we	  study	  here	   (see	  Betzold	  
2014,	  for	  a	  notable	  exception).	  	  
	  
EXISTING	  ACCOUNTS	  OF	  CORPORATE	  POLITICAL	  ACTIVITY	  AND	  TRANSNATIONAL	  LOBBYING	  
Work	   on	   trade	   policy	   is	   rather	   limited	   in	   the	  mainstream	   business	   studies	   literature.	   One	   of	   the	   first	  
attempts	  to	  model	  the	  process	  of	  CPA	  in	  a	  trade	  policy	  context	  was	  by	  Baron	  (1995;	  1997).	  He	  modelled	  
the	  interaction	  between	  governments	  and	  companies	  involved	  in	  WTO	  disputes	  and	  illustrated	  his	  case	  
with	   the	   Kodak-­‐Fuji	   dispute,	   which	   started	   at	   national	   level	   in	   the	   US,	   before	   escalating	   to	   the	  
multilateral	   level	   in	  the	  predecessor	  to	  the	  WTO,	  the	  GATT	  (Baron	  1997).	  His	  model	  views	  government	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policy	  as	  being	  related	  to	  domestic	  interests	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  to	  national	  import	  and	  export	  practices	  
with	   distributional	   consequences	   in	   the	   domestic	   economy	   on	   the	   other.	   Since	   Baron’s	   early	   work,	  
several	   studies	   in	   the	   business	   literature	   have	   looked	   at	   the	   process	   of	   lobbying	   for	   trade	   protection,	  
which	  indicate	  that	  CPA	  in	  trade	  policy	  is	  more	  multifaceted.	  For	  example	  Lindeque	  and	  McGuire	  (2008)	  
analysed	   Anti-­‐dumping	   cases	   in	   the	   US,	   where	   they	   identify	   three	   key	   firm	   capabilities	   vital	   to	   a	  
successful	  outcome:	  capacity	  to	  mobilise	  relevant	  information,	  capacity	  to	  build	  their	  case	  and	  capacity	  
to	  adjust	  strategies	  to	  avoid	  action.	  Lindeque	  (2007)	  has	  also	  developed	  a	  theoretical	  model	  of	  company	  
CPA	   in	   the	   US	   anti-­‐dumping	   arena.	   Others	   have	   explored	   how	   non-­‐	   governmental	   organisations	   have	  
expanded	  their	  influence	  in	  the	  trade	  arena,	  acting	  as	  a	  counterweight	  to	  business	  (Farrand	  2015).	  	  
	   More	   extensive	   work	   on	   trade	   lobbying	   exists	   in	   the	   fields	   of	   International	   Economics	   and	  
International	  Political	  Economy	  (IPE).	  The	  focus	  of	  this	  scholarship	  is	  mainly	  on	  the	  circumstances	  under	  
which	   firms	   lobby	   for	   trade	  policy	  outcomes	  and	  how	  governments	  balance	  different	   interests	   in	   their	  
trade	  policymaking.	  Within	  this	  body	  of	  literature,	  trade	  policy	  outcomes	  are	  usually	  seen	  as	  a	  function	  
of	  political	  conflict	  shaped	  by	  the	  preferences	  of	  different	  domestic	  actors	  (Frieden	  and	  Rogowski	  1996).	  
Decision-­‐makers	  are	  seen	  as	  political	  support-­‐maximizers	  and	  have	  no	  explicit	  trade	  policy	  preferences	  of	  
their	   own	   (Grossman	   and	   Helpman	   1994).	   Under	   such	   assumptions	   they	   should	   lean	   towards	   the	  
demands	  of	  those	  societal	  interests	  best	  able	  to	  overcome	  their	  collective	  action	  problems	  (Olson	  1965).	  
In	   the	   context	   of	  WTO	  disputes,	   litigation	   is	   typically	   seen	   as	   the	   result	   of	   lobbying	  by	   large	  domestic	  
exporting	   firms	   pressuring	   their	   home	   government	   to	   bring	   a	   case	   in	   order	   to	   (self)enforce	   access	   to	  
foreign	   markets,	   while	   import-­‐competing	   firms	   in	   the	   defendant	   state	   are	   expected	   to	   lobby	   their	  
government	  to	  refrain	  from	  market	  opening	  (Bown	  2009;	  Davis	  2012;	  Zimmerman	  2011).	  	  
	   The	  key	  shortcoming	  of	  most	  of	  the	  existing	  scholarship	  summarized	  above	   is	  that	  trade	  policy	  
outcomes	   are	   assumed	   to	   be	   the	   result	   of	   domestic	   CPA.	  What	   is	  more,	  much	   of	   this	   scholarship	   (in	  
particular	  the	  work	  by	  economists)	  is,	  due	  to	  data	  availability	  (Hillman	  et	  al	  2004),	  both	  US	  focused	  and	  
models	  lobbying	  in	  terms	  of	  financial	  contributions	  to	  domestic	  political	  campaigns.	  However,	  as	  a	  result	  
of	  the	  globalization	  of	  production	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  GVCs	  (Gereffi	  1994),	  many	  goods	  and	  services	  
are	  no	  longer	  being	  produced	  in	  a	  certain	  country	  but	  are	  “made	  in	  the	  world.”	  This	  has	  complicated	  the	  
concept	  of	  what	  constitutes	  ‘domestic	  interest.’	  In	  addition,	  although	  financial	  resources	  certainly	  matter	  
to	   transnational	   lobbying,	   they	   are	   unlikely	   to	   be	   measurable	   solely,	   or	   even	   primarily,	   in	   terms	   of	  
financial	  contributions	  to	  politicians	  or	  party	  structures,	  while	  the	  complex	  nature	  of	  many	  trade	  issues	  
makes	   technical	   knowledge	   an	   important	   resource	   (Woll	   and	   Artigas	   2007).	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	  
establishment	  of	  the	  WTO	  in	  1995	  provides	  MNEs	  an	  additional	   level	  of	  governance	  to	  which	  they	  can	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appeal	   for	   redress	   in	   cases	   of	   government	   action	   which	   threatens	   to	   undermine	   their	   profitability	  
(Lindeque	  and	  McGuire	  2007;	  Windsor	  2007),	  while	  the	  WTO’s	  DSB	  has	  more	  far	  reaching	  powers	  than	  
its	  predecessors,	  making	   it	  a	  more	  attractive	  forum	  for	  challenging	  policy	  (Lawton	  et	  al.	  2009).	  What	   is	  
more,	  the	  trade	  regime	  has	  become	  increasingly	  complex,	   incorporating	  not	   just	  the	  WTO	  and	   its	  DSB,	  
but	  also	  a	  wide	  web	  of	  bilateral	  trade	  and	  investment	  agreements,	  which	  provides	  companies	  with	  “the	  
possibility	   of	   forum	   shopping	   similar	   to	   the	   practice	   in	   a	   public	   law	   context	   of	   choosing	   among	   court	  
jurisdictions”	  (Davis	  2009:	  25).	  	  
	   There	   is	   increasing	   scholarship,	   which	   demonstrates	   that	   the	   emergence	   of	   GVCs	   can	   indeed	  
change	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  trade	  policy	   (e.g.	  Curran	  2015;	  Eckhardt	  2015;	   Jensen	  et	  al.	  2015;	  Kim	  
2015;	   Manger	   2009).	   However,	   this	   work	   has	   still	   tended	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   national	   or	   regional	   level.	  
Others	  have	  begun	  to	  explore	  the	   increasing	  attention	  paid	  by	  MNEs	  to	  the	  WTO,	  but	   focus	  mainly	  on	  
the	  macro	   level	   and	   the	   structure	  of	   such	   lobbying	  –	  e.g.	  product-­‐specific	   versus	   sector-­‐wide	   lobbying	  
(De	  Bièvre	  et	  al	  2016)	  –	  or	  the	  choices	  MNEs	  need	  to	  make	  on	  the	  allocation	  of	  scare	  corporate	  resources	  
across	   different	   levels	   of	   governance	   (Lawton	   et	   al	   2009;	  Windsor	   2007).	   This	   research	   provides	   little	  
guidance	  on	  what	  factors	  are	  likely	  to	  predispose	  an	  MNE	  to	  engage	  multilaterally,	  rather	  than	  focusing	  
efforts	  on	  domestic	  lobbying	  and	  what	  form	  the	  former	  political	  activity	  may	  take.	  In	  particular,	  lobbying	  
in	  third	  country	  contexts	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  accessing	  the	  WTO	  dispute	  settlement	  systems	  has	  been	  
subject	  to	  limited	  scholarship.	  	  
Some	  existing	  work	  on	   ‘foreign’	   lobbying	  on	  trade	  policy	  does	  exist.	  However,	   the	   few	  existing	  
analyses	  look	  at	  the	  US	  and	  tend	  to	  assume,	  rather	  intuitively,	  that	  the	  objective	  of	  such	  CPA	  would	  be	  
market	  opening	   in	   the	   lobbied	   state	   (Destler	  and	  Odell	  1987;	  Gawande	  et	  al	  2006;	  Kee	  et	  al.	  2007).	  A	  
notable	  exception	  is	  recent	  research	  by	  Eckhardt	  and	  De	  Bièvre	  (2015),	  which	  highlights	  a	  growing	  trend	  
for	  MNEs	   to	   lobby	   third	   countries	   (i.e.	   not	   their	   home	   country	  or	   the	   target	  market)	  with	   the	   specific	  
objective	   of	   accessing	   the	   WTO.	   The	   authors	   provide	   some	   conclusions	   on	   the	   type	   of	   companies	  
undertaking	   transnational	   lobbying	   and	   the	   circumstances	   under	  which	   they	  would	   do	   so,	   but	   do	   not	  
explore	  in	  any	  detail	  the	  choice	  of	  target	  state	  or	  the	  decision	  by	  states	  to	  pursue	  cases.	  	  
Finally,	  there	  has	  been	  some	  work	  on	  transnational	  lobbying	  activities	  in	  policy	  fields	  other	  than	  
trade	   like	   environmental	   protection	   (Betzold	   2014;	   Eilstrup-­‐Sangiovanni	   and	   Bondaroff	   2014;	   Rietig	  
2016)	   investment	   (Lee	   2016)	   and	   financial	   regulation	   (Kastner,	   2014;	   Young,	   2012).	  However,	  most	   of	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this	  work	  focuses	  on	  non-­‐government	  organizations	  (NGOs),	  rather	  than	  companies	  or	  business	  groups.
1
	  
A	   recent	  analysis	  of	   such	   transnational	  advocacy	  defines	   it	  as	   ‘…non-­‐state	  actors	  based	   in	  one	  country	  
forming	   transnational	   advocacy	  networks	   (TANs)	  with	   similar	   entities	   in	   other	   countries…’	   (Bob,	   2013:	  
72)	   and	   further	   clarifies	   that	   such	   advocacy	   targets	   international	   organizations	   and	   their	   members.	  
Although	   the	  arena	   for	  our	   case	   study	   is	   such	  an	   international	  organization	   (i.e.	   the	  WTO),	  we	  do	  not	  	  
focus	  on	  the	  coordination	  of	   lobbying	  across	  national	  contexts.	  Rather	  we	  are	   interested	   in	  the	  driving	  
factors	  behind	  the	  conscious	  choice	  of	  MNEs	  to	  reorient	  their	  lobbying	  activities	  from	  their	  home	  context	  
to	  a	  more	  supportive	  political	  environment,	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  accessing	  the	  multilateral	  governance	  
system.	  This	   form	  of	   transnational	  advocacy	  has	  been	  very	   little	  studied.	  One	  exception	   is	   the	  work	  of	  
Betzold	  (2014)	  who	  explored	  NGO’s	  choice	  of	  target	  governments	  in	  climate	  change	  negotiations.	  One	  of	  
her	  key	  findings	  was,	  contrary	  to	  expectations,	  that	  low	  income	  countries	  were	  relatively	  more	  likely	  to	  
be	   subject	   to	   lobbying.	   The	   reason	   proposed	  was	   that	   	   that	   ‘[d]elegations	   from	   low-­‐income	   countries	  
tend	  to	  be	  small	  and	  thus	  have	  only	  few	  experts;	  accordingly,	  their	  need	  for	  external	  support	  is	  relatively	  
high,	  which	  may	  make	  them	  susceptible	  to	  NGO	  input’	  (Betzold	  (2014:	  51).	  Although	  Berzold’s	  focus	  is	  on	  
NGOs,	  some	  of	  her	  insights	  are	  pertinent	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  transnational	  CPA	  we	  address	  here.	  
	  
THE	  ARGUMENT	  
Taking	  into	  consideration	  the	  fundamental	  changes	  in	  the	  global	  political	  economy	  and	  the	  shortcomings	  
in	   the	   existing	   literature	   discussed	   above,	   we	   now	   present	   our	   argument.	   As	   indicated	   in	   the	  
introduction,	   we	   focus	   on	   the	   conditions	   under	   which	   companies	   pursue	   CPA	   in	   the	   trade	   arena	   in	  
countries	  other	  than	  their	  home	  country	  (i.e.	  transnational	  lobbying);	  the	  determinants	  of	  their	  choice	  of	  
certain	   target	  governments	  over	  others;	  and	  why	  host	  governments	  would	  mobilize	   in	   the	   interests	  of	  
MNEs.	  	  
	  
The	  willingness	  to	  bring	  a	  challenge	  at	  multilateral	  level	  and	  capacity	  to	  lobby	  a	  host	  country	  	  
The	  attraction	  of	  bringing	  a	  case	  to	  the	  Dispute	  Settlement	  Body	  (DSB)	  of	  the	  WTO	  is	  that	  it	  reduces	  the	  
chances	  of	  a	  dispute	  with	  a	  state	  being	  impacted	  by	  legal	  home	  advantage.	  It	  also	  brings	  the	  debate	  to	  
international	   attention,	   a	   distinct	   advantage	   if	   the	   problem	  at	   issue	   is	   a	   generic	   one,	   likely	   to	   arise	   in	  
other	   jurisdictions	   and	   contexts.	   Finally	   it	   enables	   the	   complaining	   companies	   to	   frame	   the	  dispute	   in	  
legal	  terms	  –	  as	  an	  issue	  of	  coherence	  between	  international	  and	  national	  law.	  This	  could	  be	  expected	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1
	  Notable	  exceptions	  are	  Young	  (2012),	  who	  looks	  at	  transnational	  efforts	  by	  banks	  and	  their	  organisations	  to	  
impact	  on	  the	  Basle	  Committee	  and	  Lee	  (2016),	  who	  looks	  at	  how	  investors	  incorporate	  in	  a	  foreign	  jurisdiction	  to	  
gain	  access	  to	  favourable	  investment	  protection	  treaties.	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reduce	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  non-­‐technical	  arguments	  (Bach	  and	  Blake	  2016).	  However,	  WTO	  challenges	  
are	   very	   complex	   for	   a	   company,	   or	   even	   a	   group	   of	   companies,	   to	   mount.	   The	   WTO	   is	   an	   inter-­‐
governmental	  institution,	  so	  only	  governments	  can	  challenge	  other	  governments’	  regulations	  in	  the	  WTO	  
DSB.	  That	  is,	  ‘[f]irms	  do	  not	  have	  legal	  standing	  in	  the	  [WTO]	  disputes	  process.	  They	  rely	  on	  governments	  
to	  act	  as	  their	  agents	  in	  Geneva’	  (Lawton	  et	  al	  2009:	  11).	  WTO	  action	  requires	  the	  mobilization,	  not	  just	  
of	   a	   company’s	   own	   resources,	   but	   also	   those	  of	   a	   plaintiff	   government,	  which	  needs	   to	  be	  willing	   to	  
follow	  the	  case	  through	  the	  WTO	  procedures.	  In	  any	  given	  country	  only	  a	  small	  fraction	  of	  firms	  has	  such	  
capabilities	  (Bown	  2009).	  The	  number	  of	  firms	  which	  are	  willing	  and	  able	  to	  lobby	  a	  foreign	  government	  
to	   bring	   a	  WTO	   DSB	   case	   would	   be	   expected	   to	   be	   even	   smaller.	  We	   suggest	   that	   there	   are	   several	  
necessary	  conditions	  under	  which	  companies	  engage	  in	  such	  transnational	  lobbying.	  	  
Firstly,	   the	  evidence	  suggests	   that	   the	   firm	   in	  question	  must	  have	  a	  clear	   incentive	   to	  mobilize	  
politically.	   We	   argue	   that	   such	   an	   incentive	   exists	   in	   particular	   when	   being	   confronted	   with	   a	   policy	  
measure	  that	  poses	  a	  real	  and	  existential	  threat	  to	  the	  company	  or	  industry	  and	  involves	  high	  expected	  
adjustment	  costs.	  The	  notion	  that	  a	  perceived	  threat	  to	  material	   interests,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  regulations	  or	  
government	  initiated	  changes	  in	  market	  conditions,	   is	  a	  primary	  condition	  affecting	  a	  firm’s	  decision	  to	  
lobby	  is	  well	  established	  in	  the	  literature	  (Vernon,	  1966),	  as	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  firms	  are	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  
lobby	  when	  faced	  with	  potential	  losses	  in	  revenue,	  than	  in	  pursuit	  of	  a	  lucrative	  market	  opportunity	  (Dür	  
2010).	  The	  likelihood	  of	  political	  action	  is	  particularly	  high	  when	  firms	  face	  high	  costs	  of	  adjustment	  from	  
new	  trade	  restrictions	  (Curran	  2015).	  Or,	  as	  Aidt	  and	  Hwang	  (2014:	  291)	  put	   it	   ‘…	  foreign	   lobby	  groups	  
seek	  influence	  on	  policy	  choices	  abroad	  only	  when	  they	  really	  have	  a	  stake	  in	  the	  policy	  choice.’	  	  
	   Secondly,	  the	  companies	  in	  question	  need	  to	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  overcome	  the	  classic	  collective	  
action	  problems	   involved	   in	   such	   action.	   Lobbying	   to	   initiate	   and	  maintain	   a	   trade	  dispute	   is	   resource	  
intensive,	  even	  when	  the	  target	  is	  the	  domestic	  context	  and	  the	  issue	  is	  well	  institutionalized	  –	  like	  anti-­‐
dumping	  (Lindeque,	  2007).	  These	  problems	  are	  even	  more	  challenging	  when	  lobbying	  for	  WTO	  action.	  As	  
demonstrated	  by	  Bown	  (2009),	  historically	  the	  driving	  force	  behind	  most	  WTO	  trade	  disputes	  have	  been	  
large-­‐	  and	  highly	  productive	  domestic	  exporting	  firms.	  These	  firms	  have	  enough	  resources	  to	  overcome,	  
not	   only	   the	   fixed	   costs	   of	   exporting	   (e.g.	   establishing	   foreign	   networks	   and	   marketing	   products	   to	  
foreign	  consumers),	  but	  also	   the	  additional	  high	  costs	  associated	  with	  WTO	   litigation.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  
firms	  able	  to	  sustain	  such	  a	  prolonged	  collective	  action	  all	  the	  way	  to	  a	  WTO	  panel	  ruling	  in	  their	  favour,	  
are	  mainly	  from	  advanced	  industrialized	  members.	  In	  case	  of	  trans-­‐national	  foreign	  lobbying,	  firms	  need	  
to	  maintain	  this	  resource	  intensive	  activity	  over	  a	  long	  period,	  outside	  of	  their	  home	  base.	  Only	  the	  most	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internationalized	   firms,	  operating	   in	  well-­‐endowed	   sectors,	  with	   a	  high	   concentration	   ratio	   and	  a	  high	  
mobilization	  rate	  will	  be	  able	  to	  engage	  in	  such	  transnational	  lobbying	  (Eckhardt	  and	  De	  Bièvre	  2015).	  	  
	   Thirdly,	  firms	  need	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  government	  officials.	  Being	  well	  connected	  to	  policy-­‐maker	  
with	  similar	  views	  on	  a	  certain	  policy	  goal	  and	  being	  able	  to	  built	  credibility	  by	  providing	  (critical)	  access	  
goods	  to	  public	  officials,	  is	  pivotal	  for	  firms	  aiming	  to	  wield	  influence	  on	  policy	  outcomes	  (Baumgartner	  
et	  al.	  2009;	  Hattaway	  1998;	  Pagliari	  and	  Young	  2014).	  Such	  privileged	  access	  to	  decision-­‐makers	  is	  much	  
more	  prevalent	  at	  the	  national	   level.	   	  Thus	  mobilizing	  a	  firm’s	  home	  country	  as	  their	   ‘agent	   in	  Geneva’	  
would	  be	  the	  most	  logical	  strategy	  for	  an	  MNE	  to	  take.	  Governments	  generally	  support	  companies	  which	  
are	  based	  in	  their	  home	  state	  in	  trade	  disputes	  because	  of	  the	  assumed	  benefits	  that	  a	  firm’s	  economic	  
activity	  brings	   to	   the	  domestic	  economy	   in	   terms	  of	   jobs,	   taxes	  and	   foreign	  exchange	  earnings	   (Baron,	  
1997).	  In	  a	  case	  (such	  as	  that	  which	  we	  study	  here)	  where	  such	  support	  is	  not	  feasible,	  the	  challenge	  of	  
gaining	  access	  to	  national	  officials	  in	  a	  foreign	  country	  is	  substantial,	  although	  it	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  
for	  successful	  transnational	   lobbying.	  One	  route	  to	  secure	  such	  access	   is	   for	  the	  MNE	  to	  ally	  with	   local	  
companies	  with	  shared	  interests	  (Aidt	  and	  Hwang	  2014).	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  local	  allies,	  a	  strong	  impact	  on	  
the	  local	  economy	  and	  perceived	  dependence	  on	  the	  company	  for	  employment	  and/or	  national	  income	  
would	  appear	  to	  be	  vital	  to	  securing	  access	  and	  influence	  with	  foreign	  policy	  makers.	  	  
	  
The	  logic	  of	  transnational	  corporate	  political	  activity	  
Our	  second	  research	  question	  focuses	  on	  why	  MNEs	  would	  decide	  to	  lobby	  a	  foreign	  government	  in	  the	  
first	  place	  and	  the	  choice	  of	  target	  government	  when	  engaging	  in	  host	  country	  CPA	  for	  WTO	  action.	  As	  
indicated	  above,	  an	  MNE	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  approach	  its	  ‘home’	  government	  when	  seeking	  redress	  
through	  the	  WTO.	  For	  firms	  to	  approach	  a	  foreign	  country,	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  good	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  
the	   home	   country	   will	   not	   be	   supportive.	   There	   are	   several	   reasons	   why	   this	   might	   be	   the	   case:	  
governments	  may	  have	   ideological	  bias	  against	  certain	  sectors,	  especially	   ‘sin’	   industries	   like	  gambling,	  
tobacco	   and	   alcohol,	   or	   the	   firms	   in	   question	   may	   be	   considered	   less	   important	   for	   the	   domestic	  
economy	   than	  more	  productive	   firms	   (retailers	   for	   example)	   (Eckhardt	   and	  De	  Bièvre	  2015).	   In	   such	  a	  
context,	  it	  is	  a	  rational	  strategy	  to	  target	  host	  governments	  to	  bring	  a	  complaint	  to	  the	  WTO	  instead.	  	  
	   Such	  a	  route	  is	  both	  diplomatically	  risky	  and	  administratively	  time	  consuming	  for	  the	  host	  	  state	  
and	  shared	  interests	  are	  obviously	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  the	  success	  of	  such	  CPA.	  A	  company’s	  contribution	  
to	  the	  economy	  can	  be	  a	  powerful	  lever	  for	  political	  support	  and,	  given	  the	  extensive	  economic	  impacts	  
MNEs	  have	  through	  their	  GVCs,	  MNEs	  increasingly	  have	  the	  option	  to	  leverage	  these	  impacts	  for	  political	  
ends	   in	   countries	  other	   than	   their	   home	   state.	  However,	  we	  also	   consider	   that	   there	   is	   an	   ideological	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component	   in	   seeking	   shared	   interests,	   especially	   in	   sectors	   which	   are	   controversial,	   like	   tobacco	   or	  
gambling,	  where	  ideology	  has	  an	  important	  role	  in	  guiding	  government	  preferences	  (Cohen	  et	  al,	  2000).	  	  
Finally,	  material	  resources	  are	  key	  to	  accessing	  the	  DSB.	  Indeed	  in	  their	  analysis	  Lindeque	  and	  McGuire	  
(2007:	  735)	  note	  that	  the	  two	  key	  countries	  that	  use	  the	  DSB	  regularly	  and	  pursue	  disputes	  all	  the	  way	  to	  
appeal	  are	  the	  US	  and	  EU	  as	  “Brussels	  and	  Washington	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  see	  a	  dispute	  through	  to	  the	  
bitter	  end.’	  Similarly,	  Schaffer	  et	  al	  (2007)	  highlight	  that	  Brazil	  is	  one	  of	  only	  a	  few	  emerging	  countries	  to	  
have	  developed	  the	   institutional	  capacity	   to	  successfully	   launch	  WTO	  cases.	  However	   the	  very	  basis	  of	  
the	  WTO	   is	   that	  all	  members	  have	  equal	   rights	  and	   thus	   the	   legal	  possibility	  exists	   for	  any	  member	   to	  
challenge	   another	   member.	   Trommer	   (2014)	   argues	   that	   WTO	   law	   has	   therefore	   provided	   the	  
opportunity	  for	  ostensibly	  less	  influential	  actors	  to	  challenge	  powerful	  states,	  on	  multiple	  levels:	  ‘…global	  
trade	   politics	   is	   a	   rules-­‐based	   multi-­‐level	   policy	   field	   in	   which	   state	   and	   non-­‐state	   actors	   with	   many	  
different	   goals,	   resources	   and	   strategies	   compete	   over	   policy	   outcomes’	   (op	   cit:	   16).	   A	   gap	   therefore	  
exists	  between	  the	  theoretical	  capacity	  of	  all	  states	  to	  use	  the	  WTO	  to	  address	  their	  grievances,	  and	  their	  
actual	  capacity	  to	  do	  so.	  Given	  that	  this	  gap	  is,	  at	  least	  partly	  resource	  based,	  material	  support	  from	  non-­‐
state	  actors	  could	  help	  overcome	  the	  barriers	  to	  DSB	  access.	  
	  
Finding	  common	  cause	  with	  MNEs	  -­‐	  de-­‐constructing	  political	  influence	  
On	   the	   final	   question	   of	  why	   certain	   countries	   find	   common	   interests	  with	  MNEs	   in	   such	   a	   situation,	  
while	   others	   are	   reluctant	   to	   do	   so,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   understand	   that	   trade	   negotiations	   in	   Geneva	  
essentially	   consist	   of	   a	   long	  drawn	  out	   iterative	   game.	   Supporting	  or	   challenging	   another	   country	   in	   a	  
certain	  dispute	  or	  negotiation	  has	   implications	  for	  relations	  with	  that	  country	   in	   future	  negotiations	  or	  
disputes	   (Alvarez	   2002).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   taking	   a	   case	   in	   the	   WTO	   has	   costs,	   both	   in	   terms	   of	  
administrative	  effort	  (often	  a	  major	  barrier	  for	  developing	  countries,	  see	  e.g.	  Kim	  2008)	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  
jeopardizing	   relations	   with	   the	   defendant	   state	   and	   reducing	   the	   chances	   of	   their	   support	   in	   future	  
negotiations.	  	  
	   Based	  on	  earlier	  work,	  we	  can	  formulate	  some	  propositions	  on	  the	  factors	  guiding	  state’s	  choices	  
in	  bringing	  WTO	  disputes.	  The	  decision	   to	   formally	   challenge	  a	   fellow	  member	  clearly	  depends	  on	   the	  
bilateral	   relationship	  and	   the	  nature	  of	   the	   two	   states.	   Lindeque	  and	  McGuire	   (2007)	   find	   that	   the	  US	  
successfully	   rebuffs	   a	   disproportionately	   large	   number	   of	   WTO	   disputes	   at	   their	   initial	   stages.	   They	  
consider	   this	   to	   be	   due	   to	   the	   powerful	   position	   of	   the	   US	   in	   such	   disputes:	   ‘…with	   many	   smaller	  
countries	   worried	   about	   angering	   trade	   lobbies	   in	   the	   US	   Congress	   and	   about	   losing	   access	   to	   the	  
American	  market’	  (p.742).	  Yet	  tiny	  Antigua	  took	  the	  US	  to	  WTO	  over	  its	  gambling	  legislation.	  The	  reasons	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behind	   this	   decision	  were	   in	   part	   related	   to	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   gambling	   industry	   to	   the	  Antiguan	  
economy	  	  (Eckhardt	  and	  de	  Bièvre	  2015).	  Thus	  a	  very	  strong	  national	  interest	  can	  motivate	  even	  a	  small	  
state	  to	  mobilise	  at	  the	  WTO.	  	  
	   From	  the	  analyses	  above,	   it	   seems	  reasonable	   to	  hold	   that	  only	  a	   state	   that	  believes,	  not	  only	  
that	  a	  given	  measure	  is	  counter	  to	  WTO	  law,	  but	  also	  that	  it	  has	  a	  key	  national	  interest	  at	  stake	  and/or	  
that	   the	   defendant	   country	   is	   either	   too	   small	   or	   too	   far	   away	   to	   be	   a	   useful	   ally,	   or	   potentially	  
uncooperative	  in	  future	  negotiations	  in	  any	  case,	  is	  likely	  to	  jeopardize	  their	  bilateral	  diplomatic	  relations	  
by	  taking	  a	  WTO	  case.	  However,	  in	  reality	  we	  know	  very	  little	  about	  the	  criteria	  countries	  may	  use	  when	  
they	  choose	  to	  take	  cases	  in	  WTO.	  We	  seek	  to	  inform	  this	  question	  in	  our	  analysis	  below.	  
	  
METHODOLOGY	  	  
To	  explore	  our	  research	  questions	  and	  test	  our	  argument	  we	  will	  analyse	  the	  transnational	  CPA	  of	  TTCs	  
in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   plain	   packaging	   case.	   We	   are	   aware	   that	   some	   question	   the	   validity	   of	   theory	  
building	  from	  case	  studies,	  yet	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  scholars	  argue	  that	  social	  sciences	  have	  become	  
too	   reliant	   on	   quantitative	   research	   and	   formal	   models	   and	   have	   shown	   the	   pivotal	   importance	   of	  
qualitative	   case	   studies	   for	   theory	  building	   and	   testing	   (George	  and	  Bennett	   2005).	   In	   addition,	   in	   the	  
context	   of	   trade	   policy,	   case	   studies	   of	   past	   trade	   disputes,	   which	   we	   draw	   on	   in	   this	   paper,	   have	  
provided	  rich	  raw	  material	  for	  theory	  building	  (Baron	  1997;	  Curran,	  2015;	  Eckhardt	  and	  de	  Bievre	  2015;	  
Kolk	  and	  Curran	  2015;	  Lawton	  et	  al	  2009).	  Only	  through	  an	  in-­‐depth	  case	  study	  are	  we	  able	  to	  identify	  
the	   behavior	   and	   preferences	   of	   multiple	   actors	   involved	   in	   the	   PP	   case,	   as	   well	   as	   unravelling	   the	  
complex	  multilateral	  political	  approach	  taken	  by	  TTCs.	  	  	  
	   In	  terms	  of	  data	  gathering,	  we	  have	  searched	  the	  scholarly	  literature	  on	  the	  PP	  case	  using	  Google	  
Scholar,	  PubMed,	  EBSCO	  and	  JSTOR.	  Most	  existing	  analysis	  of	  the	  case	  we	  found	  consist	  of	  legal	  analysis	  
of	  the	  potential	  merits	  of	  the	  challenges	  made	  (Marsoof	  2012;	  Mitchell	  2010;	  Mitchell	  and	  Wurzberger	  
2011;	  Voon	  and	  Mitchell	  2011),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  likely	  effects	  of	  plain	  packaging	  on	  public	  health	  objectives	  
(Germain	  et	  al.	  2010;	  Wakefield	  et	  al.	  2013).	  These	  analyses	  helped	  us	  to	  deconstruct	  the	  arguments	  of	  
actors	  involved,	  but	  did	  not	  really	  help	  to	  resolve	  the	  puzzle	  of	  why	  the	  TTCs	  adopted	  such	  a	  multi-­‐level	  
approach,	  the	  choice	  of	  target	  countries	  and	  why	  the	  complainants	  would	  give	  in	  to	  the	  firms’	  demands.	  	  
	   Therefore,	  we	  also	  undertook	  a	  search	  of	  the	  Truth	  Tobacco	  Industry	  Documents	  archive	  at	  the	  
University	   of	   San	   Francisco	   (https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco)	   using	   Boolean	   terms	  
and	  a	  snowballing	  technique.	  The	  key	  words	  used	  were	  ‘Plain	  Packaging’,	  ‘WTO’,	  ‘Australia’	  as	  well	  as	  all	  
of	   the	   claimant	   countries,	   in	   English,	   Dutch	   and	   Spanish.	  We	   retrieved	   15	   documents	   relevant	   to	   the	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case.	   We	   also	   searched	   the	   DSB	   database	   for	   relevant	   documents	   on	   the	   case	  
(https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm)	   and	   analysed	   the	   minutes	   from	   the	  
WTO’s	   Technical	   Barriers	   to	   Trade	   (TBT)	   Committee	   (http://tbtims.wto.org)	   and	   the	   Trade-­‐Related	  
Aspects	   of	   Intellectual	   Property	   Rights	   (TRIPS)	   Council	  
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_e.htm#issues).	   In	   addition,	   we	   gathered	   press	  
reports	  through	  the	  LEXISNEXIS	  database	  and	  statements	  released	  by	  the	  Australian	  government	  and	  the	  
tobacco	   industry.	   Finally,	   we	   conducted	   a	   series	   of	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews	   with	   public	   officials	  
involved	   in	   the	  case,	   representatives	  of	   the	   industry	   	   (the	   International	  Tobacco	  Growers	  Association	   -­‐	  
ITGA)	   and	   tobacco	   control	   NGOs	   (the	   Smoke	   Free	   Partnership	   -­‐	   SFP).	   The	   questions	   addressed	   the	  
evolution	   of	   the	   case,	   the	   role	   of	   industry	   and	   the	   key	   arguments	   posed	   by	   each	   side.	   Due	   to	   the	  
sensitive	   nature	   and	   the	   case	   being	   ‘sub	   judice,’	   only	   the	   ITGA	   and	   SFP	   were	   willing	   to	   talk	   ‘on	   the	  
record’.	  	  We	  also	  requested	  interviews	  with	  the	  Embassies	  of	  all	  of	  the	  complainant	  states	  in	  Geneva	  and	  
other	  representatives	  of	  the	  tobacco	  industry	  and	  their	  trade	  organizations,	  but	  none	  responded	  to	  our	  
repeated	  requests.	  
	  
AN	  EMPIRICAL	  ACCOUNT	  OF	  THE	  PLAIN	  PACKAGING	  CASE	  
Recent	   figures	   show	   that	   there	   are	   currently	   6	  million	   tobacco-­‐related	  deaths	   annually	   (Eriksen	   et	   al.,	  
2015).	  Plain	  packaging	  is	  considered	  a	  key	  tool	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  smoking	  and	  is	  actively	  promoted	  by	  
the	  World	  Health	  Organisation,	  most	  recently	  on	  ‘World	  No	  Tobacco	  Day’	  in	  May	  2016	  where	  the	  theme	  
was	   ‘Get	   ready	   for	   plain	   packaging.’	   It	   is	   argued	   that	  making	   the	   packaging	   of	   tobacco	   products	   less	  
attractive	  reduces	  their	  appeal	  and	  encourages	  smokers	  to	  stop,	  while	  discouraging	  young	  people	  from	  
taking	  up	  the	  habit	   (WHO,	  2016).	  As	  part	  of	  a	  package	  of	   tobacco	  control	  measures,	  Australia	  was	  the	  
first	  country	  to	   introduce	  PP	   legislation	   in	  2011,	  requiring	  that	  tobacco	  be	  sold	   in	  standard	  olive	  green	  
packs,	  which	  also	  carry	  large	  warning	  images.	  The	  name	  of	  the	  product	  is	  included	  in	  standard	  font,	  but	  
trademarks	  and	  logos	  are	  banned.	  	  
	   The	   industry	   consistently	  argues	   that	  plain	  packaging	  will	  not	   reduce	  demand	   for	   tobacco,	  but	  
will	   rather	   commoditize	   their	   product	   and	   push	   down	   prices,	   thus	   encouraging	   consumption,	   while	  
facilitating	   illicit	   sales,	  with	  subsequent	  negative	   impacts	  on	   legitimate	  retailers	   (Department	  of	  Health	  
2013a+b;	  Jarman	  2013;	  PJ	  Carroll	  and	  Co	  2014;	  PMI,	  2014).	  Recent	  analysis	  of	  the	  industries’	  arguments	  
in	   the	   UK	   debate	   on	   PP	   noted	   both	   the	   huge	   volume	   of	   industry	   inputs	   and	   their	   selective	   use	   of	  
evidence	  on	   impacts	   (Ulucanlar	  et	  al.	  2014).	  Furthermore,	   the	   industry	  argues	   that	  banning	   the	  use	  of	  
their	  trademarks	  amounts	  to	  illegal	  acquisition	  of	  their	  intellectual	  property	  (Jarman	  2013;	  PJ	  Carroll	  and	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Co,	  2014;	  PMI,	  2014).	  This	   is	  the	  argument	  which	   is	  most	  pertinent	   in	  the	  WTO	  case	  we	  study	  here.	   In	  
2009,	   Lalive,	   the	   international	   legal	   consultancy,	   provided	   PMI	   with	   a	   detailed	   argumentation	   on	   the	  
possible	  inconsistencies	  between	  WTO	  law	  and	  PP	  legislation	  (Lalive,	  2009).	  The	  arguments	  provided	  in	  
that	  report	  have	  been	  widely	  used	  by	  the	  industry	  and	  the	  complainants	  in	  the	  WTO	  case.	  
	   The	  PP	  case	  was	  not	  the	  first	  WTO	  DSB	  case	  on	  tobacco:	  there	  have	  been	  thirteen	  such	  disputes,	  
ten	  of	  which	  were	  brought	  after	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  WTO	  in	  1995.	  However,	  the	  five	  cases	  brought	  
in	  2012	  and	  2013	  against	  Australia’s	  PP	  legislation	  are	  the	  most	  important	  tobacco	  control	  cases	  in	  the	  
history	   of	   the	  multilateral	   trading	   system.	   Table	   1	   provides	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   legal	   actions	   taken	   in	  
relation	   to	   the	  PP	  case.	  After	  Australia	   introduced	   the	   legislation	   in	  2011,	   the	   first	   legal	   challenge	  was	  
taken	  at	  the	  national	  level,	  where	  the	  Australian	  High	  Court	  ruled	  that	  the	  law	  was	  not	  in	  breach	  of	  the	  
constitution	  (Jarman	  2013;	  Marsoof,	  2012).	  The	  second	  level	  at	  which	  it	  was	  challenged	  was	  an	  ISDS	  case	  
under	   the	  Australia-­‐Hong	  Kong	  BIT,	  where	  Philip	  Morris’	  Asia	   claimed	   that	   the	   legislation	  barred	   them	  
from	   using	   their	   intellectual	   property,	   with	   the	   consequent	   effect	   of	   diminishing	   the	   value	   of	   its	  
investments	   in	  Australia.	  According	  to	  UNCTAD’s	  Investment	  Dispute	  Navigator,	  this	  case	  was,	  not	  only	  
the	   first	  case	  under	   the	  Australia-­‐HK	  BIT,	  but	   the	   first	   to	  be	   taken	  against	  Australia	  by	   investors	  under	  
any	  BIT.
2
	   In	  December	  2015,	   the	   ISDS	  tribunal	  “deemed	  that	  PM	  Asia	  was	  “abusing”	  the	   investor-­‐state	  
arbitration	   process	   in	   the	   plain	   packaging	   case,	   and	   therefore	   rejected	   the	   company’s	   claims	   and	  
declined	  to	  exercise	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  dispute”	  (Bridges	  2016).	  Finally,	  Ukraine,	  Honduras,	  Dominican	  
Republic,	  Cuba	  and	  Indonesia	  challenged	  the	  law	  in	  WTO.	  The	  WTO	  is	  hearing	  the	  cases	  together.	  
	   	  
[Table	  1	  here]	  
	   	  
	  
The	  willingness	  and	  capacity	  of	  TTCs	  to	  bring	  a	  challenge	  at	  the	  multilateral	  level	  
	  In	   terms	   of	   the	   question	   of	   why	   this	   case	   emerged	   so	   rapidly	   at	   the	  WTO,	   challenging	   government	  
legislation	   in	   its	  domestic	  courts	   is	  always	  difficult	  and	  research	  has	  confirmed	  that	   foreign	  companies	  
are	   disadvantaged	   in	   lawsuits	   (Bhattacharya	   et	   al.	   2007;	   Mezias	   2002).	   The	   challenge	   under	   the	   HK-­‐
Australia	   BIT	  was	   problematic	   for	   jurisdictional	   reasons	   (as	   the	   outcome	   demonstrated).	   Philip	  Morris	  
Hong	  Kong	  had	  only	  acquired	  Philip	  Morris	  Australia	  ten	  months	  after	  the	  plain	  packaging	  legislation	  was	  
announced.	   The	   tribunal	   therefore	   judged	   that	   the	   corporate	   restructuring	  was	   undertaken	  mainly	   or	  
solely	  to	  establish	  rights	  under	  the	  BIT	  and	  rejected	  the	  claim	  (Bridges	  2016;	  Voon	  and	  Mitchell	  2016).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2
	  http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/11?partyRole=2	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Although	  some	  authors	  hold	   that	  BIT	  context	   is	  more	  business	   friendly	   (Fooks	  and	  Gilmore;	  2013),	   the	  
WTO	  level	  nevertheless	  provided	  an	  international	  forum,	  divorced	  from	  the	  national	  level	  and	  a	  legalistic	  
context	  (the	  panels	  that	  examine	  the	  complaints	  are	   largely	  made	  up	  of	   legal	  experts)	  to	  challenge	  the	  
legislation	  (Princen	  2007).	  In	  1990,	  tobacco	  industry	  interests	  had	  prevailed	  in	  the	  first	  key	  challenge	  to	  
international	   tobacco	  trade	  regulation,	  taken	  by	  the	  US	  against	  Thailand’s	  ban	  on	  foreign	  cigarettes,	   in	  
spite	  of	  the	  mobilization	  of	  public	  health	  arguments	  by	  Thailand	  (Brandt	  2007;	  Princen	  2007).	  This	  was	  
also	   the	   case	   in	   the	  more	   recent	   Indonesian	   challenge	   to	   the	  US	   ban	  on	   clove	   cigarettes	   (Flett,	   2013;	  
Jarman	  et	  al.	  2012).	  Although	  the	  substantive	   issues	   in	  both	  were	  quite	  different	  to	  the	  PP	  case,	  these	  
successes	   indicated	   that	   the	   legalistic	   context	   in	   Geneva	   was	   not	   unfavorable	   to	   balancing	   legal	  
requirements	  against	  public	  health	  objectives.	  	  
However,	  there	  is	  another	  reason	  why	  WTO	  was	  an	  attractive	  forum	  for	  TTCs	  to	  highlight	  their	  
grievances.	  Challenging	   legislation	   in	  WTO	  raises	   the	  profile	  of	   the	   issue	  and	  ensures	  that	  all	  members	  
are	  aware	  of	  the	  challenge	  and	  informed	  of	  the	  debate.	  In	  the	  PP	  case,	  thirty	  five	  WTO	  members	  (both	  
tobacco	  producing	  countries	  and	  those	  considering	  PP	  legislation)	  requested	  to	  join	  as	  third	  parties,	  an	  
unusually	  high	  number.	  The	  widespread	  interest	  in	  the	  PP	  challenge	  is	  directly	  related	  to	  its	  capacity	  to	  
create	   ‘regulatory	   chill’	   elsewhere	   (Fooks	   and	   Gilmore,	   2013).	   Both	   New	   Zealand	   and	   the	   UK	   were	  
actively	   considering	   similar	   legislation	   when	   Australia	   passed	   theirs	   (Mitchell	   and	  Wurzberger,	   2011),	  
while	   Ireland	   subsequently	   launched	   similar	   proposals,	   following	   close	   contact	   with	   the	   Australian	  
administration	   (Studlar	   2015).	   As	   the	   case	   unfolded	   and	   further	   to	   heavy	   lobbying	   by	   the	   industry	  
detailed	   in	   Peeters	   et	   al.	   (2013),	   the	   European	   Commission	   in	   Brussels	   decided	   not	   to	   include	   PP	  
requirements	   in	   the	   revision	  of	   the	  Tobacco	  Products	  Directive,	  which	  would	  have	  applied	   throughout	  
the	  EU
3
.	  	  Launching	  a	  high	  profile	  challenge	  is	  important	  if	  an	  underlining	  objective	  is	  to	  dissuade	  others	  
from	  taking	  similar	  measures.	  In	  its	  input	  to	  consultations	  on	  draft	  legislation	  in	  other	  jurisdictions,	  TTCs	  
have	   consistently	   used	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   WTO	   challenge	   to	   argue	   that	   PP	   is	   illegal	   and	   therefore	  
potentially	  very	  costly	  for	  the	  country,	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  legal	  ruling	  going	  against	  them	  (see,	  for	  example	  
in	  Ireland,	  PJ	  Carroll	  and	  Co	  2014;	  PMI	  2014).	  Thus	  bringing	  a	  WTO	  challenge	  ensures	  that	  governments	  
across	   the	  world	  are	   fully	  aware	  of	   the	  risk	  of	  challenge	  and	  take	  this	   into	  account	   in	   their	  own	  policy	  
making.	   The	   outcome	   if	   this	   case	   is	   thus	   vital	   to	   the	   capacity	   of	   national	   governments	   elsewhere	   to	  
regulate	  tobacco	  packaging.	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  That	  Directive	  was	  itself	  subject	  to	  a	  legal	  challenge	  in	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  by	  PMI	  and	  BAT.	  The	  
challenge	  failed,	  but	  held	  up	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Directive	  (ECJ,	  2016).	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   However,	   launching	  the	  case	  required	  the	  agency	  of	  a	  state	  willing	   to	  mobilize	   in	   the	  WTO.	  As	  
discussed	   below,	   home	   countries	   were	   not	   credible	   targets,	   thus	   a	   WTO	   challenge	   required	   the	  
mobilization	  of	  a	  ‘host’	  state.	  As	  suggested	  above,	  we	  expect	  that	  there	  are	  three	  necessary	  conditions	  
for	   firms	   to	   be	  willing	   and	   able	   to	   engage	   in	   transnational/foreign	   lobbying	   and	  we	  will	   now	   analyze	  
whether	  these	  conditions	  were	  met	  in	  case	  of	  TTCs	  in	  the	  PP	  WTO	  dispute.	  	  	  
	   First,	   we	   look	   at	   the	  whether	   the	   Australian	   legislation	   posed	   a	   severe	   threat	   to	   the	  material	  
interests	  of	  TTCs	  and	  whether	  expected	  adjustment	  costs	  were	  high.	  All	  our	  empirical	  evidence	  suggests	  
that	   plain	   packaging	  was	   seen	  by	   tobacco	   firms	   as	   a	  major	   threat	   to	   their	   profitability.	   Already	   in	   the	  
1990s,	   British	   American	   Tobacco	   (BAT	   1995)	   indicated	   in	   an	   internal	   document	   that	   for	   this	   reason	  
“every	  effort	   should	  be	  made	   to	  protect	   the	   integrity	  of	   the	  company's	  packs	  and	   trade	  marks.”	  Since	  
then,	  the	  tobacco	  industry	  has	  indeed	  done	  everything	  it	  could	  “to	  challenge	  government	  restrictions	  on	  
cigarette	  marketing”	  (Porterfield	  and	  Byrnes	  2011).	  All	  our	  interviewees	  underlined	  that,	  as	  Australia	  was	  
the	  first	  country	  in	  the	  world	  to	  take	  the	  step	  of	  introducing	  PP	  legislation,	  the	  WTO	  case	  was	  absolutely	  
key	  to	  the	  industry’s	  future	  and	  the	  TTC’s	  capacity	  to	  continue	  to	  operate	  their	  current	  business	  model.	  
The	   tobacco	   growers	   association	   sees	   Australia’s	   move	   as:	   ‘…a	   key	   part	   of	   what	   some	   anti-­‐tobacco	  
activists	   call	   the	   ‘end	   game’,	   which	   aims	   to	   ruin	   basically	   the	   companies	   and	   the	   tobacco	   business’	  
(Author	   interview,	   May	   2016).	   Standardising	   packaging	   removes	   the	   last	   marketing	   tool	   from	   the	  
industry	  and	  essentially	  makes	  cigarettes	  commodities.	  The	  industry	  is	  very	  concerned	  about	  the	  impact	  
of	  PP	  on	   the	  capacity	   to	  differentiate	  between	  products	  and	   fears	  a	  price	  war	   (Author	   interview,	  May	  
2016).	  This	  point	  was	  also	  underlined	  in	  the	  minutes	  of	  meetings	  in	  the	  UK	  between	  the	  Department	  of	  
Health	   and	   both	   PMI	   and	   BAT	   on	   the	   UK’s	   PP	   proposals	   (Department	   of	   Health,	   2013a+b).	   Australia,	  
commenting	   on	   the	   case	   in	   the	   Framework	   Convention	   on	   Tobacco	   Control	   (FCTC	   2012)	   noted:	   ‘…we	  
understand	   why	   the	   opposition	   is	   as	   strong	   as	   it	   is	   from	   the	   tobacco	   industry	   –	   they	   see	   their	   very	  
existence	  threatened…’	  
	   Second,	   we	   assess	   the	   capacity	   of	   TTCs	   to	   undertake	   transnational	   lobbying	   by	   exploring	   the	  
extent	   to	   which	   the	   industry	   has	   a	   global	   presence,	   whether	   they	   are	   well	   endowed	   and	   their	  
concentration	  ratio.	  Just	  four	  MNEs	  control	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  global	  tobacco	  market	  outside	  China	  –
4	  
Philip	   Morris	   International	   (home	   economy:	   US);	   BAT
	  
	   (UK);	   Imperial	   Tobacco	   (UK);	   Japan	   Tobacco	  
International	   (Switzerland)	   (Eriksen	   2015)	   –	   and	   in	   many	   countries	   tobacco	   ranks	   among	   the	   most	  
concentrated	  sectors.	  The	  most	  commonly	  accepted	  measure	  of	  market	  concentration	  is	  the	  Hirschman–
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4
	  The	  Chinese	  tobacco	  market	  is	  entirely	  dominated	  by	  the	  state-­‐owned	  Chinese	  National	  Tobacco	  Corporation.	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Herfindahl	   Index	  (HHI).
5
	  When	  a	  market	  consists	  of	  a	   large	  number	  of	  small	  firms	  the	  HHI	   is	  close	  to	  0,	  
while	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  single	  dominant	  firm	  the	  HHI	  is	  10,000.	  	  A	  market	  with	  a	  HHI	  of	  1,800	  or	  more	  is	  
considered	  highly	  concentrated.	  The	  HHI	  score	  for	  the	  tobacco	  industry	  in	  most	  countries	  in	  the	  world	  is	  
3,000	   or	   higher	   (Hawkins	   et	   al.	   2016).	   Furthermore,	   recent	   figures	   from	   UNCTAD	   (2016)	   show	   that	  
tobacco	  companies	  are	  amongst	   the	  most	   transnational	   firms.	  Two	  tobacco	   firms	   feature	   in	  UNCTAD’s	  
“world’s	  top	  100	  non-­‐financial	  MNEs,”	  which	  ranks	  firms	  according	  to	  their	  transnationality	  index	  (TNI)
6
	  








	  on	  foreign	  assets,	  
respectively.	  What	  is	  more,	  TTCs	  are	  also	  among	  the	  world’s	  biggest	  and	  most	  profitable	  firms	  and	  rank	  
high	  on	  corporate	  profitability	  rankings	  (Gilmore	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  	  
	   Given	  the	  high	  concentration	  ratio	  of	  the	  tobacco	  industry,	  TTCs	  have	  little	  difficulty	  overcoming	  
collective	   action	   problems	   (Jarman	   2013;	   Peeters	   et	   al	   2013)	   and,	   with	   each	   of	   the	   TTCs	   being	   so	  
profitable	  and	  large,	  tobacco	  companies	  also	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  engage	  in	  individual	  lobbying.	  As	  early	  as	  
the	  1990s	  the	   industry	   lobbied	  against	  efforts	   to	   initiate	  PP	   in	  Canada,	   framing	  their	  argument	   in	   legal	  
terms,	   rather	   than	   as	   a	   public	   health	   issue.	   Relying	   on	   NAFTA’s	   investment	   chapter,	   R.J.	   Reynolds	  
Tobacco	   Company	   argued	   forcefully	   that	   PP	   would	   constitute	   an	   illegal	   expropriation	   of	   a	   protected	  
trademark,	  requiring	  Canada	  to	  pay	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  dollars	  in	  compensation.	  The	  mere	  threat	  of	  
investment	   arbitration	   had	   a	   powerful	   impact	   on	   Parliament’s	   deliberations	   and	   in	   1995	   Canada	  
abandoned	   the	  PP	   legislation	   (Porterfield	  and	  Byrnes	  2011;	   Shaffer	  et	  al	  2005).	  Another,	  more	   recent,	  
case	  of	  TTC	  lobbying	  was	  a	  dispute	  on	  Uruguay’s	   legislation	  on	  the	  size	  of	  health	  warnings	  and	  limiting	  
multiple	  versions	  of	  the	  same	  brand,	  which	  was	  challenged	  in	  2010	  by	  Philip	  Morris	  under	  the	  Uruguay-­‐
Switzerland	  BIT	  (Mitchell	  and	  Wurzberger	  2011;	  PMI	  no	  date).	  This	  challenge	  also	  failed	  with	  the	  tribunal	  
judging	  that:	  “the	  trademark	  holder	  does	  not	  enjoy	  an	  absolute	  right	  of	  use,	  free	  of	  regulation,	  but	  only	  
an	  exclusive	   right	   to	  exclude	   third	  parties	   from	  the	  market”	   (quoted	   in	  Voon	  and	  Mitchell	  2016).	  Thus	  
powerful	  TTCs	  have	  not	  hesitated	  to	  use	  all	  existing	  legal	  machinery	  to	  protect	  their	  marketing	  strategies	  
and	   avoid	   regulatory	   interference	   in	   ‘foreign’	  markets.	   The	   challenge	   to	   Australia’s	   PP	   legislation	   is	   a	  
logical	  extension	  of	  this	  strategy	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5
	  HHI	   is	   calculated	  as	   follows:	   square	   the	  market	   share	  of	   all	   the	   companies	   competing	   in	   a	   sector	   and	   sum	   the	  
result.	  E.g.,	  four	  firms	  have	  market	  shares	  of	  35,	  20,	  15,	  and	  10%	  respectively,	  the	  HHI	  is	  (35²	  +	  20²	  +	  15²	  +	  10²)	  =	  
1950.	  
6
	  Which	  looks	  at:	  the	  ratio	  of	  foreign	  assets	  to	  total	  assets;	  the	  ratio	  of	  foreign	  sales	  to	  total	  sales;	  and	  the	  ratio	  of	  
foreign	  employment	  to	  total	  employment.	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The	  logic	  of	  transnational	  corporate	  political	  activity	  
The	  logic	  of	  foreign	  lobbying	  by	  TTCs	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  result	  of	  their	  home	  states	  being	  unwilling	  or	  unable	  
to	  support	  a	  WTO	  challenge.	  Tobacco,	  like	  other	  industries	  with	  negative	  social	  externalities	  (e.g.	  alcohol,	  
arms	   production	   and	   gambling),	   is	   characterized	   as	   a	   ‘sin’	   industry.	   Such	   industries	   face	   higher	   audit	  
costs	  (Leventis	  et	  al.	  2013)	  and	  are	  undervalued	  on	  stock	  exchanges	  (Fauver	  and	  McDonald,	  2014),	  but	  
they	  are	  also	  disadvantaged	  in	  terms	  of	  access	  to	  policy	  makers	  and	  mobilizing	  political	  support.	  Rather	  
than	  facing	  competitor	  companies	  in	  disputes	  over	  policy,	  as	  in	  the	  classic	  view	  of	  trade	  disputes	  (Baron,	  
1997),	  morally	  suspect	  industries	  face	  counteractive	  lobbying	  from	  civil	  society	  actors	  like	  NGOs,	  doctors	  
and	   academics.	   This	   ‘epistemic	   community’	  militating	   against	   tobacco	   has	   had	   a	   significant	   impact	   on	  
regulation,	   securing	   stronger	  domestic	   and	   international	   tobacco	   control	  policies,	   in	   spite	  of	   extensive	  
efforts	  by	  tobacco	  companies	  to	  avoid	  them	  (Mukherjee	  and	  Ekanayake	  2009).	  
One	  of	  the	  key	  outcomes	  of	  pressure	  from	  this	  epistemic	  community	  is	  that	  the	  industry	  is	  now	  
in	  a	  situation	  where	   it	  has	  few	  political	  allies	   in	  the	  developed	  world.	   In	  1997,	  the	  US	  Congress	  passed	  
the	  Doggett	  Amendment,	  which	  barred	  personnel	  from	  the	  Departments	  of	  Commerce,	  Justice	  and	  State	  
from	  promoting	  tobacco	  abroad.	  In	  2001,	  this	  provision	  was	  extended	  to	  US	  executive	  branch	  agencies	  
(Holden	  et	  al.	  2010).	   In	  the	  European	  context,	  BAT	  complained	   in	  a	  2002	   letter	  to	  the	  President	  of	  the	  
European	   Commission	   that:	   ‘The	   industry	   continues	   to	   be	   frozen	   out	   of	   the	   regulatory	   debate’	   (BAT,	  
2002).	  What	  is	  more,	  Article	  5(3)	  of	  the	  UN’s	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Tobacco	  Control	  (FCTC),	  an	  inter-­‐
government	  agreement	  concluded	  in	  2003	  (Collin	  2004),	  limits	  tobacco	  industry	  access	  to	  policy	  makers:	  
"In	  setting	  and	  implementing	  their	  public	  health	  policies	  with	  respect	  to	  tobacco	  control,	  Parties	  shall	  act	  
to	   protect	   these	   policies	   from	   commercial	   and	   other	   vested	   interests	   of	   the	   tobacco	   industry	   in	  
accordance	   with	   national	   law.”	   As	   a	   result,	   in	   most	   signatories,	   the	   industry	   has	   limited	   capacity	   to	  
mobilize	   governments	   to	   take	   actions	   in	   their	   favour	   (Bero	   2003;	   Fooks	   and	   Gilmore	   2013).	   A	  
representative	   from	   the	   International	   Tobacco	   Growers	   Association	   (ITGA)	   we	   interviewed	   put	   it	   this	  
way:	  ‘Its	  very	  easy	  to	  fight	  tobacco,	  for	  a	  politician,	  you	  know,	  it’s	  almost	  a	  win-­‐win	  situation.	  No-­‐one	  is	  
going	  to	  challenge	  you’	   (Author	   interview	  May	  2016).	   In	  this	  context,	  seeking	  a	  more	  supportive	  policy	  
environment	  in	  low	  income	  countries	  is	  a	  rational	  strategy.	  	  	  
	  
Motivations	  of	  TTCs	  and	  complainants	  	  	  
In	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  motivations	  of	  the	  industry	  and	  the	  complainants	  in	  the	  PP	  case,	  it	  is	  
necessary	  to	  explore	  the	  economic	  and	  political	  context	  in	  the	  countries	  in	  question.	  Table	  2	  provides	  an	  
overview	  of	  the	  economic	  profile	  of	  the	  five	  complainants,	  prior	  experience	  with	  the	  WTO	  DSB	  and	  the	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extent	  of	  tobacco	  and	  cigarette	  exports	  to	  Australia,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  importance	  of	  these	  exports	  to	  their	  
total	  (merchandise)	  exports.	  Key	  Australian	  figures	  are	  included	  for	  comparison,	  together	  with	  figures	  for	  
the	   two	   countries,	   which	   are	   most	   dependent	   on	   tobacco	   in	   terms	   of	   share	   of	   exports:	   Malawi	   and	  
Zimbabwe.	  The	  complainant	  countries	  are	  listed	  in	  order	  of	  the	  filing	  of	  complaints	  on	  the	  PP	  case	  to	  the	  
WTO,	  to	  give	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  trade	  importance	  of	  the	  complainants	  over	  time.	  	  
	  
[Table	  2	  here]	  
	  
It	   is	   clear	   that,	   in	   economic	   terms,	   all	   complainant	   countries	   are	   considerably	   smaller	   than	  
Australia	   (only	   Indonesia	   comes	   close	   to	   its	   size)	   and	   considerably	   poorer.	  Moreover,	   the	   low	   level	   of	  
utilization	   of	   the	   DSB	   in	   the	   group	   is	   striking.	   Cuba	   and	   DR	   have	   never	   before	   used	   the	   DSB	   as	  
complainant.	  Honduras	  has	  used	  it	  in	  seven	  other	  cases,	  three	  of	  which	  were	  in	  the	  long	  running	  dispute	  
with	  the	  EU	  over	  its	  banana	  regime.	  All	  other	  cases	  were	  against	  neighbouring	  countries.	  Ukraine	  has	  not	  
been	  a	  heavy	  user	  of	  DSB,	  however	  it	  only	  joined	  WTO	  in	  2008.	  Up	  to	  the	  end	  of	  2015,	  Ukraine	  had	  taken	  
three	   other	   cases	   to	  WTO;	   all	   against	   neighbouring	   countries	   with	   whom	   trade	   flows	   are	   significant.	  
Indonesia	   is	   distinct	   from	   all	   of	   the	   other	   complainants	   in	   this	   case	   for	   three	   reasons.	   First,	   it	   is	   the	  
heaviest	   user	   of	   the	  DSB	   in	   the	   group,	   although	  most	   of	   the	   cases	   it	   took	   as	   complainant	   (8)	   concern	  
antidumping	   or	   safeguard	  measures	   taken	   against	   its	   exports.	   Second,	   it	   does	   not	   target	   neighboring	  
countries	  as	  a	  priority.	  	  In	  fact,	  most	  targets	  are	  geographically	  distant	  from	  Indonesia:	  the	  EU	  (2	  cases),	  
US	   (2	  cases),	  Argentina,	  Korea,	  South	  Africa	  and	  Pakistan.	  Third,	   Indonesia	  has	  been	   involved	   in	  a	  DSB	  
case	  on	  tobacco	  regulation.	  In	  2010,	  Indonesian	  brought	  a	  complaint	  against	  the	  US,	  challenging	  	  a	  ban	  
on	  clove	  cigarettes,	  and	  won	  the	  case	  on	  some	  key	  points.	  So	  the	  decision	  by	  Indonesia	  to	  pursue	  the	  PP	  
case	   in	   September	   2013	   was	   significant,	   as	   it	   brought	   to	   the	   discussions	   a	   country	   that	   had	   already	  
successfully	  challenged	  a	  large	  developed	  country	  on	  tobacco	  control	  legislation.	  
Given	   certain	   similarities	   with	   the	   PP	   case,	   it	   is	   worth	   commenting	   briefly	   on	   Indonesia’s	  
challenge	   to	   the	  US	   ban	   on	   clove	   cigarettes.	   	   Indonesia’s	   complaint	   targeted	   a	  US	   ban	   on	   the	   sale	   of	  
flavoured	   cigarettes,	   aimed	   at	   reducing	   tobacco	   consumption	   amongst	   young	   people,	   by	   eliminating	  
flavorings,	   although	   importantly,	   menthol	   cigarettes	   were	   not	   banned.	   Indonesia	   argued	   that	   the	  
legislation	   unfairly	   discriminated	   against	   their	   exports	   of	   clove	   cigarettes,	   compared	   to	   menthol	  
cigarettes,	   which	   were	   primarily	   made	   in	   the	   US	   (Howse	   and	   Levy	   2013).	   The	   core	   of	   this	   case	   was	  
therefore,	   not	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   the	   US	   had	   the	   right	   to	   ban	   certain	   tobacco	   products,	   but	  
whether	  menthol	  and	  clover	  cigarettes	  are	  ‘like	  products’	  and	  thus	  should	  be	  accorded	  equal	  treatment	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(Flett	  2013).	  Although	  Indonesia	  did	  indeed	  supply	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  clove	  cigarettes	  to	  the	  US	  market	  
prior	  to	  the	  ban	  (Howse	  and	  Levy	  2013),	  the	  market	  for	  clove	  cigarettes	  in	  the	  US	  was	  tiny	  (Jarman	  et	  al.	  
2012).	  At	  their	  peak	  in	  2007,	  ITC	  figures	  indicate	  that	  US	  imports	  of	  clove	  cigarette	  from	  Indonesia	  were	  
$16,6m,	  a	  rather	  low	  level	  of	  trade	  to	  justify	  such	  a	  costly	  undertaking	  as	  a	  WTO	  challenge.	  So	  why	  did	  
Indonesia	  take	  such	  a	  path?	  Research	  on	  the	  Indonesian	  cigarette	  industry	  has	  highlighted,	  both	  its	  long-­‐
term	  political	   influence	  (Lawrence	  and	  Collin	  2004)	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  TTCs	  (PMI	  and	  BAT)	  have	  recently	  
expanded	  there	  through	  acquisition	  of	  two	  of	  the	  top	  four	  local	  companies	  (Hurt	  et	  al	  2012).	  	  The	  same	  
research	  highlights	  the	  influence	  of	  TTCs	  on	  the	  Indonesian	  government’s	  launch	  of	  a	  ‘roadmap’	  for	  the	  
tobacco	  industry	  in	  2007	  which	  called	  for	  a	  12%	  increase	  in	  tobacco	  production	  by	  2020	  and	  concluded	  
‘…the	  TTCs	  influence	  on	  Indonesian	  policy	  is	  quite	  remarkable’	  (Op	  cit	  p.	  310).	  Probably	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this	  
influence,	  Indonesia	  has	  not	  signed	  the	  FCTC.
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The	  PP	  case	  against	  Australia	  was	  atypical,	  not	  just	  because	  of	  its	  geographical	  distance	  from	  all	  
of	   the	   complainants	   (except	   Indonesia),	   but	   also	   because	   of	   the	   universally	   low	   trading	   relationship	  
between	  complainants	  and	  defendants	  in	  the	  product	  at	  issue.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  tobacco	  to	  
trade,	  in	  Indonesia	  and	  Ukraine	  it	  is	  of	  minor	  importance	  and	  only	  in	  Cuba	  and	  the	  DR	  does	  it	  represent	  
more	  than	  5%	  of	  trade.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  value	  of	  Australian	  imports	  at	  issue,	  it	  was	  only	  when	  Cuba	  and	  
more	   so,	   Indonesia	   filed	   complaints,	   that	   the	   figures	   became	   in	   any	  way	   significant.	   Ukraine	   had	   not	  
exported	  any	  tobacco	  to	  Australia	  in	  the	  previous	  10	  years,	  yet	  in	  2015	  it	  suddenly	  began	  exporting,	  with	  
$0,73m	  of	  trade	  in	  cigarettes	  that	  year.	  Most	  Australian	  tobacco	  imports	  come	  from	  New	  Zealand,	  Korea	  
and	  Singapore,	  who	  together	  accounted	  for	  86%	  of	  imports	  in	  2015.	  Yet	  none	  of	  these	  exporters,	  all	  of	  
whom	  were	  early	  signatories	  of	  the	  FCTC,	  complained	  to	  the	  WTO	  about	  the	  PP	  legislation.	  	  
The	  reasoning	  behind	  Ukraine’s	  withdrawal	  of	   its	  complaint	  also	  yields	   interesting	   lessons.	  The	  
challenge	  had	  always	  been	  very	  controversial	  in	  the	  country,	  where	  the	  health	  ministry	  complained	  that	  
they	  were	  not	  consulted	   in	  the	  decision	  (Jarman	  2013).	   It	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  made	  by	  the	  Economics	  
Ministry	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   economic	   importance	   of	   tobacco	   to	   Ukraine.	   PMI	   has	   a	   factory	   there	  
employing	  1400	  people	  (Fooks	  and	  Gilmore,	  2013)	  and	  Imperial	  tobacco	  (no	  date)	  noted	  ‘…importance	  of	  
a	   legal	   tobacco	   industry	   is	   confirmed	  by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   top	   ten	   largest	   taxpayers	   in	  Ukraine	   include	  
three	   tobacco	   companies.’	   Thus	   Ukraine’s	   position	   as	   a	   host	   to	   large	   TTCs	  made	   it	   part	   of	   their	   GVC,	  
fostering	  common	  interests.	  However,	  the	  true	  extent	  of	  these	  interests	  was	  questionable.	  Withdrawing	  
the	  complaint,	  the	  trade	  minister	  stated	  in	  a	  press	  conference:	  “First,	  now	  we	  have	  restricted	  resources	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  Details	  of	  signatories	  and	  ratification	  of	  the	  FCTC	  for	  this	  paper	  were	  accessed	  here:	  
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IX-­‐4&chapter=9&lang=en	  on	  30th	  may	  
2016	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and	  we	  would	  like	  to	  send	  them	  to	  the	  direct	  trade	  interest	  of	  Ukraine.	  Second,	  economic	  logic	  is	  absent	  
in	  this	  dispute,	  and	  third,	  the	  dispute	  has	  negative	  consequences	  for	  our	  country,”	  (Bridges,	  2015).	  Thus	  
resources,	  economic	  logic	  and	  lack	  of	  negative	  consequences	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  key	  factors	  in	  initiating	  
and	  pursuing	  a	  dispute	  
Finally,	  a	  brief	  look	  at	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  two	  most	  tobacco	  dependent	  countries	  –	  Malawi	  and	  
Zimbabwe	  –	  provides	  some	  indication	  of	  why	  they	  did	  not	  bring	  a	  WTO	  case.	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  issue	  
at	  stake	   is	  not	   in	  doubt:	  both	  depend	  very	  heavily	  on	   tobacco	  exports.	  One	  key	   factor	  explaining	   their	  
failure	   to	  mobilize	   is	  obviously	   their	   lack	  of	   financial	   and	  administrative	   resources.	   The	   ITGA,	  of	  which	  
Malawi	   and	   Zimbabwe	   are	   founder	  members,	   put	   it	   this	  way:	   ‘It’s	   a	   very	   technical	   thing…It’s	   a	   highly	  
sophisticated	  case	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  its	  costly	  and	  these	  countries	  are	  poor’	  (Author	  interview,	  May	  
2016).	   In	  addition,	  they	  had	  no	  prior	  experience	  of	  such	  challenges.	  Although	  this	  did	  not	  stop	  Cuba	  in	  
the	  PP	  case,	  Malawi	  and	  Zimbabwe	  are	  considerable	  poorer.	  They	  are	  also	  much	  more	  dependent	  on	  the	  
goodwill	  of	  the	  larger	  countries	  in	  the	  world	  trading	  system.	  According	  to	  World	  Bank	  figures	  (2010-­‐14),	  
development	  aid	  accounted	  for	  an	  average	  of	  23%	  of	  Malawi’s	  GDP	  and	  7%	  of	  Zimbabwe’s.	  In	  terms	  of	  
the	  FCTC,	  Zimbabwe	  has	  been	  a	  signatory	  since	  2014,	  although	  Malawi	  is	  not	  and	  thus,	  in	  theory,	  is	  not	  
bound	  by	  the	  need	  to	  support	  tobacco	  control.	  The	  tobacco	  industry	  has	  acknowledged	  funded	  the	  legal	  
fees	  of	   at	   least	   three	  of	   the	   complainants	   (Ukraine,	  Honduras	  and	  Dominican	  Republic)	   (Jarman	  2013;	  
Scott	  Kennedy,	  2014),	  so	  material	  support	  would	  have	  been	  available	  for	  a	  challenge	  from	  a	  very	  poor	  
country.	  However	  the	  country	  would	  still	  have	  had	  to	  undertake	  the	  administrative	  tasks	  involved	  in	  the	  
challenge	   and	   accompanying	   follow	   up	   meetings	   and	   briefings.	   Given	   that	   the	   embassies	   of	   such	  
countries	   are	   generally	   small	   and	   sparsely	   staffed,	   this	  would	  have	  been	  a	   considerable	  draw	  on	   their	  
resources.	  Both	  countries	  have	  joined	  the	  case	  as	  third	  parties.	  Even	  that	  relatively	  ‘light’	  involvement	  is	  
something	  they	  have	  very	  rarely	  done	  in	  the	  WTO.	  
The	   discussion	   above	   gives	   us	   some	   insights	   into	   why	   certain	   countries	   challenged	   the	   PP	  
legislation	  and	  why	  these	  countries	  would	  have	  been	  seen	  by	  TTCs	  as	  potentially	  ‘friendly’	  states	  in	  terms	  
of	  CPA.	  The	  tobacco	   industry	  documents,	  which	  we	  accessed	  through	  the	  “Truth”	  Tobacco	  Archive,	  do	  
not	   provide	   conclusive	   evidence	   that	   the	   industry	   directly	   lobbied	   the	   countries	   in	   question.	   They	   do	  
indicate,	  however	   that,	   in	   the	   course	  of	  2011,	   representatives	   from	  Philipp	  Morris	  Benelux	   (who	  have	  
production	  facilities	  in	  Holland),	  the	  Dutch	  smoking	  tobacco	  association	  (VNK)	  and	  the	  association	  of	  the	  
Dutch	   Cigar	   industry	   (NVS)	   lobbied	   public	   officials	   from	   the	   Dutch	   ministries	   of	   Economic	   Affairs,	  
Agriculture	  and	  Health	  on	   several	  occasions	  urging	   the	  Dutch	  Government	   to	  bring	   the	  PP	  case	   to	   the	  
attention	   of	   the	   EU	   authorities,	   with	   a	   view	   to	   complaining	   at	   the	   WTO	   TBT	   committee	   (NVS	   2011;	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Philipp	  Morris	  Benelux	  2011;	  VNK	  2011).	   In	  parallel,	  the	  European	  Smoking	  Tobacco	  Association	  (ESTA)	  
also	  directly	  lobbied	  officials	  of	  DG	  Trade	  in	  the	  European	  Commission	  requesting	  them	  to	  raise	  the	  issue	  
at	   the	  WTO	  (ESTA	  2011).	  These	  efforts	  were	  clearly	  unsuccessful.	  However,	  minutes	  of	   the	  WTO’s	  TBT	  
and	  TRIPS	  committees	  suggest	  that	  the	  efforts	  of	  TTCs	  were	  successful	  elsewhere,	  as	  they	  show	  that	  (i)	  
PP	   has	   rapidly	   become	   one	   of	   the	  most	   discussed	   topics	  within	   the	  WTO;	   and	   (ii)	   the	   arguments	   put	  
forward	   by	   countries	   critical	   of	   PP	   are	   strikingly	   similar	   to	   the	   arguments	   used	   by	   TTCs	   in	   their	  
communications	   (Eckhardt	   et	   al	   2015;	   Lencucha	   et	   al	   2016).	   Although	   there	   are	   no	   records	   in	   the	  
database	   of	   exchanges	   with	   the	   complainants,	   this	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   such	   exchanges	   did	   not	   take	  
place.	   Rather	   it	   indicates	   that	   if	   they	   did	   take	   place,	   they	   have	   not	   been	   made	   public	   through	   legal	  
action.
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  However	   the	   fact	   that	   TTCs	  are	  paying	   the	   legal	   fees	  of	   the	   first	   three	   complainants	   indicates	  
that	  there	  were	  extensive	  discussions	  and	  that	  these	  culminated	  in	  the	  provision	  of	   important	  material	  
support	   by	   the	   TTCs	   to	   these	   countries.	   As	   discussed	   above,	   such	   support	   is	   vital	   to	   small	   developing	  
countries	  seeking	  to	  access	  the	  DSB.	  Indeed	  the	  work	  of	  Betzold	  (2014)	  in	  the	  context	  of	  NGO	  advocacy,	  
indicates	   that	   low	   income	   countries	   may	   be	  more	   susceptible	   to	   lobbying	   influence	   because	   of	   their	  
relative	  lack	  of	  own	  resources.	  
The	  role	  of	  TTCs	  in	  the	  challenges	  of	  Indonesia	  and	  Cuba	  is	  more	  difficult	  to	  gauge.	  As	  discussed	  
above,	  the	  tobacco	  industry	  has	  historically	  had	  strong	  political	  influence	  in	  Indonesia	  and	  the	  TTCs	  are	  
very	   present	   there.	   It	   seems	   likely	   that	   the	   role	  of	   TTCs	  was	   important,	   but	   not	   vital.	   Indonesia	   has	   a	  
history	  of	  challenges	  in	  WTO,	  including	  in	  tobacco	  and	  is	  not	  a	  signatory	  to	  the	  FCTC.	  In	  Cuba,	  a	  strong	  
role	  for	  the	  TTCs	  seems	  unlikely,	  given	  the	  government	  monopoly	  on	  production.	  However	  since	  1994,	  
Imperial	  Tobacco	  has	  had	  a	   joint	  venture	  with	   the	  state	  owned	  Tobacco	  Company	   to	  sell	  Cuban	  cigars	  
overseas	   and	   since	   2000	   has	   a	   100-­‐year	   agreement	   with	   the	   government	   to	   be	   its	   exclusive	   partner	  
(Habanos	  no	  date;	  Mickle	  2016).	  The	  company	  is	  thus	  likely	  to	  have	  some	  political	  influence.	  For	  Cuba	  a	  
key	   factor	   in	   the	  challenge	   is	   likely	   to	  be	   the	   fear	  of	   spillover	   into	   the	  cigar	  sector.	  As	   the	   ITGA	  noted,	  
origin	  is	  a	  huge	  part	  of	  the	  value	  of	  a	  cigar	  ‘…the	  brand	  name	  in	  cigars	  is	  much	  more	  important	  than	  in	  
cigarettes.’	   (Author	   interview,	  May	  2016).	   Fear	  of	   loss	  of	   their	   ability	   to	  distinguish	  Cuban	  brands	  was	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  The	  Truth	  archive	  mainly	  relies	  on	  documents	  made	  public	  through	  court	  cases.	  This	  makes	  it	  particularly	  unlikely	  
that	  recent	  exchanges	  will	  be	  archived.	  
	   21	  
CONCLUSIONS	  
In	  this	  paper	  we	  have	  looked	  at	  multilateral	  and	  transnational	  CPA	  by	  MNEs	  and	  sought	  to	  answer	  three	  
key	  questions.	  First,	  what	  factors	  explain	  the	  choice	  and	  ability	  of	  MNEs	  to	  politically	  target	  multilateral	  
institutions?	  Overall,	   our	   analysis	   of	   the	   PP	   case	   indicates	   that	   challenging	   the	   legislation	   at	   the	  WTO	  
was,	   for	   TTCs,	   both	   a	   strategy	   to	   increase	   the	   profile	   of	   the	   dispute	   and	   dissuade	   other	   governments	  
from	  taking	  similar	  action	  (i.e.	   regulatory	  chill)	  and	  an	  effort	  to	  avoid	  domestic	   legal	  bias	  by	  moving	  to	  
the	  multilateral	  level,	  while	  shifting	  the	  framing	  of	  the	  discussion	  from	  a	  public	  health	  issue	  to	  a	  legalistic	  
and	  technical	  level.	  One	  of	  our	  interviewees	  indicated	  that	  ‘the	  main	  driver	  of	  the	  tobacco	  market	  now	  is	  
regulation,	   by	   far’	   and	   that	   in	   this	   context	   a	  multilateral	   challenge	  by	  TTCs	   to	  national	   legislation	   that	  
risked	   spillover	   to	  other	  markets,	   is	   a	   logical	   step	   (Author	   interview,	  May	  2016).	   As	   such,	   our	   analysis	  
provides	  new	  insights	   into	  MNE	  lobbying	   in	   international	  trade	  disputes	  over	  domestic	  regulations	  and	  
complement	   the	   emerging	   scholarship	   on	   the	   political	   economy	   of	   international	   regulation	   and	  
“regulatory	  capture”	  (De	  Bièvre	  et	  al.	  2014;	  Lawton	  et	  al	  2009;	  Roemer-­‐Mahler	  2013;	  Woll	  and	  Artigas,	  
2007;	  Young	  2012;	  Young	  2016).	  The	  findings	  presented	  here	  also	  confirm	  earlier	  research	  (Eckhardt	  and	  
de	  Bievre	  2015),	  which	   indicates	   that	   in	   order	   to	  undertake	   transnational	   CPA,	   companies	  need	   to	  be	  
facing	  a	  real	  and	  existential	  threat,	  that	  they	  need	  to	  be	  highly	  globalized,	  concentrated,	  well-­‐	  organized	  
and	   endowed.	   In	   the	   PP	   case,	   TTC	   indeed	   faced	   major	   threats	   to	   their	   business	   model	   and,	   as	   the	  
tobacco	  industry	  is	  highly	  concentrated	  and	  TTCs	  are	  very	  large	  internationally	  coordinated	  companies,	  
adopting	  a	  multilateral	  strategy	  appeared	  to	  be	  relatively	  straightforward.	  	  
The	   second	   question	   we	   wished	   to	   address	   was	   the	   factors	   that	   explain	   MNE’s	   choice	   of	  
government	   when	   seeking	   to	   mobilize	   action	   at	   the	   multilateral	   level?	   The	   PP	   case	   suggests	   that	  
companies	  with	  a	   low	  perceived	  contribution	  to	   the	  domestic	  economy	  and/or	   involvement	   in	  morally	  
suspect	   sectors	   are	   likely	   to	   experience	   difficulties	   mobilizing	   their	   home	   state.	   This	   difficulty	   is	  
particularly	  notable	  in	  the	  case	  of	  tobacco	  because	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  international	  convention	  (the	  
FCTC),	  which	   binds	   states	   to	   limiting	   TTCs	   access	   to	   the	   policy	  making	   process.	   In	   this	   context	   certain	  
third	  countries	  seemed	  likely	  to	  provide	  a	  more	  favorable	  political	  context.	  Although,	  when	  mounting	  a	  
WTO	  challenge	  it	  may	  be	  preferably	  that	  complainants	  have	  exports	  to	  the	  defendant	  country,	  this	  was	  
clearly	  not	  a	  necessary	  condition	  in	  the	  PP	  case.	  From	  the	  TTCs	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  most	  likely	  candidates	  
to	   approach	   with	   a	   view	   to	   mounting	   a	   challenge	   would	   be	   countries	   strongly	   linked	   to	   their	   GVCs,	  
especially	  those	  with	  strong	  dependence	  on	  tobacco	  cultivation	  or	  cigarette	  production.	  It	  is	  evident	  that	  
TTCs	  would	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  get	  a	  favourable	  hearing	  in	  states	  where	  they	  have	  important	  production	  
facilities	   and	   indeed,	   in	   all	   complainants	   but	  Cuba,	   this	  was	   the	   case.	  We	  argue	   that	   the	  potential	   for	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such	   GVC	   linkages	   to	   impact	   on	   government	   policy	   is	   not	   sufficiently	   taken	   into	   account	   in	   current	  
models	  of	  trade	  policy	  making	  (Baron	  1997;	  Bown	  2009;	  Davis	  2012;	  Lindeque	  and	  McGuire	  2007;	  Woll	  
and	   Artigas	   2007;	   Zimmerman	   2011).	   The	   emergence	   of	   GVCs	   –	   in	   combination	  with	   the	   increasingly	  
complex	  international	  trade	  regime	  –	  provides	  possibilities	  for	  MNEs	  to	  act	  well	  beyond	  the	  classic	  CPA,	  
which	  was	  aimed	  primarily	  at	  ensuring	  domestic	  market	  protection.	  	  	  
Finally,	  why	  would	  governments	  make	  the	  choice	  to	  mobilize	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  foreign	  firms?	  In	  
other	  words,	  what	  factors	  explain	  successful	  transnational	  CPA?	  The	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  is	  of	  course	  
interlinked	  with	  that	  of	  the	  previous	  one.	  MNEs	  target	  countries	  that	  they	  believe	  share	  their	  interests.	  
For	  the	  countries	  that	  did	  pursue	  the	  case	  (Ukraine,	  Honduras,	  Dominican	  Republic,	  Cuba	  and	  Indonesia)	  
the	   direct	   economic	   effect	   of	   the	   Australian	   legislation	   was	   not	   the	   key	   motivator	   for	   the	   cases.	  
However,	   given	   the	   long	   term	   trend	   towards	  more	  extensive	   tobacco	   control	  measures	   and	  especially	  
the	   possibility	   of	   PP	   gaining	   ground	   in	   several	   other	   jurisdictions,	   regulatory	   chill	   was	   a	   key	   interest	  
shared	   between	   the	   TTCs	   and	   target	   governments	   where	   tobacco	   was	   important	   to	   the	   economy.	  
However,	  the	  main	  suppliers	  of	  tobacco	  products	  to	  Australia,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  that	  are	  most	  dependent	  
on	  tobacco	  exports,	  are	  conspicuously	  absent	  from	  the	  list	  of	  complainants.	  We	  argue	  that	  the	  absence	  
of	  the	  former	  is	  due	  to	  the	  ideological	  bias	  of	  the	  governments	  in	  question	  against	  tobacco,	  as	  evidenced	  
by	  their	  membership	  of	  the	  FCTC.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  latter,	  it	  is	  more	  likely	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  capacity,	  but	  
perhaps	  also	  fear	  of	  negative	  impacts	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  wider	  (development)	  support	  provided	  by	  Western	  
governments.	   Such	   very	   poor	   developing	   countries	   have	   little	   incentive	   to	   undermine	   their	   wider	  
diplomatic	  relations	  with	  supportive	  governments	  (Bown	  and	  Hoekman	  2005).	  
We	   find	   that	   the	  countries	   that	  did	  mount	  challenges	   i)	  were	  all	  developing	  countries,	  but	  not	  
extremely	  poor	  ones,	   and	  hence	  had	  a	   certain	   level	  of	   resources	   (and	  could	   rely	  on	   the	  TTCs	   for	   legal	  
support);	   ii)	  dependent	  on	  tobacco,	  but	  not	  overwhelmingly	  so;	  and	  iii)	  were,	  apart	  from	  Indonesia,	  far	  
enough	   away	   from	   Australia	   to	   have	   little	   to	   lose	   in	   trade	   terms	   from	   rising	   bilateral	   trade	   tensions.	  
Beyond	  the	  economic	  factors,	  the	  ideological	  stance	  of	  the	  government	  on	  tobacco	  seems	  to	  have	  also	  
been	  a	  key	  factor	  (see	  also	  Cohen	  et	  al.	  2000).	  Our	  findings	  shed	  further	  light	  on	  foreign	  lobbying	  and	  the	  
political	   interactions	  between	  MNEs	  and	  host	  governments.	  Existing	  research	  on	  host	  country	   lobbying	  
has	   looked	  almost	  exclusively	  at	   investment	  disputes	   (e.g.	  Lee	  2016)	  and	  the	  work	  on	   trade	  policy	  has	  
focused	  on	  tariffs	  and	  in	  particular	  on	  “the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  foreign	  lobbying”	  (Aidt	  and	  Hwang	  2014:	  
272).	  By	  unraveling	  the	  choice	  of	  target	  states	  for	  foreign	  lobbying	  and	  the	  decision	  by	  states	  to	  pursue	  
WTO	  cases,	  we	  offer	  a	  more	  explicit	  IPE	  analysis.	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   Our	  in-­‐depth	  case	  study	  of	  the	  PP	  case	  has	  shown	  how	  the	  breath	  of	  MNE’s	  GVCs	  creates	  shared	  
interests	  across	  several	  states,	  while	   the	  WTO	  and	  other	   international	  bodies	  provide	  a	  state	  centered	  
governance	  system	  which	  opens	  up	  the	  possibility	  for	  novel	  interest-­‐based	  alliances	  between	  states	  and	  
non-­‐state	   actors.	   These	   factors	   will	   undoubtedly	   continue	   to	   open	   new	   avenues	   of	   CPA	   beyond	   the	  
traditional	  focus	  on	  the	  home	  state,	  not	  only	  in	  trade	  policy,	  but	  in	  other	  arenas	  and	  will	  require	  theory	  
to	  expand	  its	  coverage	  to	  incorporate	  such	  transnational	  action.	  Although	  the	  multilateral	  context	  of	  the	  
WTO	   is	   quite	   specific,	   there	   is	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	   similar	   factors	   could	   explain	   government	  
mobilization	  in	  favor	  of	  foreign	  MNEs	  present	   in	  their	  territory	  (i.e.	  transnational	  mobilization)	   in	  other	  
multilateral	  fora,	  such	  as	  those	  which	  address	  environmental	  protection	  or	  international	  tax	  avoidance.	  
The	   emergence	   of	   inter-­‐governmental	   organizations	   which	   impact	   on	   the	   governance	   of	   the	   global	  
economy	   creates	  opportunities	   for	   transnational	   lobbying	   in	  many	   issue	   areas	  beyond	   trade,	   however	  
existing	  studies	  of	  transnational	  advocacy	  have	  tended	  to	  focus	  on	  NGOs,	  rather	  than	  business	  and	  have	  
tended	   to	   view	   transnational	   lobbying	   in	   terms	   of	   international	   coordination	   (Dür	   and	   Mateo	   2014;	  
Farrand	   2015;	   Kastner	   2014;	   Rietig	   2016).	   Few	   have	   addressed	   the	   question	   of	   the	   choice	   of	   target	  
government	   (Betzold,	   2014).	  Our	  analysis	   indicates	   that	   the	   factors	  explaining	   successful	   transnational	  
lobbying	   at	   WTO	   level	   are;	   access	   to	   MNE’s	   own	   resources	   to	   counteract	   domestic	   resource	  
shortcomings,	  high	  perceived	  dependence	  of	  the	  economy	  on	  the	  sector	  in	  question	  and	  low	  exposure	  to	  
retaliatory	   action	   by	   the	   targeted	   state.	   More	   work	   is	   needed	   in	   a	   wider	   range	   of	   fora	   to	   better	  
understand	  whether	  similar	  factors	  can	  be	  identified	  in	  other	  arenas	  of	  transnational	  CPA.	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Table	  1	  –	  Timeline	  of	  key	  actions	  taken	  against	  Australia’s	  PP	  legislation	  
Date	   Action	   Level	   Current	  situation	  
July	  2011	   PP	   legislation	   introduced	   to	  
Australian	  parliament	  
National	   Approved.	  Entered	  into	  force	  December	  
2012	  
2012	   BATA	   and	   JIT	   challenge	   law	   in	  
Australian	  court	  
National	   Rejected	  by	  6-­‐1.	  August	  2012	  
November	  2011	   Request	   for	   arbitration	   under	  
HK-­‐Australia	  BIT	  
Bilateral	   ISDS	   tribunal	   upheld	   Australia’s	  
argument	  (detailed	  in	  Daley,	  2011)	  that	  
they	   don’t	   have	   jurisdiction	   as	   PM	  
Australia	   was	   owned	   by	   Swiss	   arm	   of	  
PM	  prior	   to	  2011	   (The	  Guardian,	  2015;	  
Bridges	  2016).	  	  
March	  2012	   Ukraine	  challenge	  law	  in	  WTO	  	   Multilateral	   Reportedly	   suspended	   in	   June	   2015	  
(Bridges,	  2015)	  
April	  2012	   Honduras	  challenge	   Multilateral	   Panel	   constituted	   in	   May	   2014.	  
Preliminary	  report	  due	  first	  half	  of	  2016	  
July	  2012	   Dominican	  Republic	  challenge	   Multilateral	   ditto	  
May	  2013	   Cuba	  challenge	   Multilateral	   ditto	  
September	  2013	   Indonesian	  challenge	   Multilateral	   ditto	  











	   35	  
Table	  2	  –	  The	  five	  complainants:	  economic	  profile,	  prior	  experience	  with	  DSB	  and	  tobacco	  trade	  figures	  
Country	   GDP	  
(2014)	  
GDP/Cap	   Year	   of	  
members
hip	   of	  















a	   ($)	  
2015	  














a	   ($)	  
2015	  	  

















r	   of	  
FCTC	  
Ukraine	   $89bn	   $2,08
1	  
2008	   3	   3	   $0,73
m	  





1994	   7	   none	   $0,05
m	  





1950	   None	   7	   $0,37
m	  





1948	   None	   None	   $4,3
m	  









1950	   9	   13	   $12m	   0,5	   $7,6
m	  











	   	   Yes	  
Malawi	   $4,2b
n	  
$274	   1964	   0	   0	   $0,06
m	  





$458	   1948	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   27%	   Yes	  
*	  2013	  figures,	  **2006	  figures	  












	  https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm	  	  
11
http://www.trademap.org	  	  	  
